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AIRCRAFT NOISE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE HUSHKIT PROBLEM
BENEDICTE A. CLAES* **

1

I. INTRODUCTION
HE AVIATION industry has changed tremendously since
the seventies. The doubling in air traffic volume coupled
with increased airport congestion awakened the aviation industry to the adverse impact of aviation on the environment. Emissions of pollutants, such as hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
and nitrogen oxide, and increasing noise pollution in the vicinity of airports represent the clearest examples of how air traffic
2
threatens the environment.
Simultaneously, national and international bodies realized
the limits of total trade liberalization and recognized the importance of protecting the environment. Both within the former
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") framework
T

* At the time this article was written, the author was a graduate student at the
Georgetown University Law Center, where she completed a Masters degree in
Common Law Studies (LL.M.). Cum Laude. Before attending the Georgetown
University Law Center, the author worked as a trainee at the European Commission and as an associate at the law firm of Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels, Belgium.
The author also completed a Masters degree in European Community Law
(LL.M.) at the College of Europe, Bruges and a "Licentiaat in de Rechten"
Magna Cum Laude at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. The views
expressed here are exclusively those of the author.
** Please be aware that this article is up-to-date as of the end of March 2000.
Because this is a continually changing area of law, portions of this article may
require updating.
I The author wishes to thank Professor Allan I. Mendelsohn, Professor Warren
L. Dean, Jr., Ms. Heather L. Miller, and Mr. Ignacio L6pez de Romafia for their
helpful comments. This article also benefits from discussions with Monique
Tousseyn and Laurent Muschel of the Transport Directorate of the European
Commission, Nathalie Marchioro of ACI-Europe, and Richard Marchi of ACINorth America. The views expressed, however, are exclusively those of the
author.
2 See Robert V. Garvin, Aircraft Engines and the Environment: Cleanerand Quieter is
the Promise of the Nineties, in AIR TRANSPORT AND POLICY IN THE 1990s 53, 53-60
(Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 1991).
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and the current World Trade Organization ("WTO") structure,
policymakers increasingly consider environmental issues.
In response to the growing willingness to prioritize the maintenance of a sound environment for present and future generations,4 the aviation industry was adamant about addressing these
poignant "aviation-induced" environmental problems within the
framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO").
Notwithstanding the actions taken by ICAO to address the
problem of aircraft engine noise by adopting international noise
standards in Volume I of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention"),' the growing
noise pollution around Community airports prompted the European Union ("EU") 6 to take even more stringent measures.
In April 1998, the Commission of the European Union7 submitted a proposal' for a regulation aimed at precluding certain
certificated aircraft from serving Community airports as of April
3 "The Preamble to the WTO Agreement includes direct references to the objective of sustainable development and the need to protect and preserve the environment. The new Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT
Agreement") and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures take explicitly into account the use of governments of measures to protect human, animal and plant
life and health and the environment." See Background to WTO work on the
trade and environment (visited Mar. 14, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/backgrou.htm>.
4 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration provides: "The right to development must
be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, 14June 1992, adopted 14June 1992, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
5 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter "Chicago Convention"].
6 The European Union was formally created by the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), agreed and signed on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on
November 1, 1993. The Union has a tripartite structure: (1) the three European
Communities (the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community), (2) the Common and Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and (3) the Co-operation in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA).
7 The European Commission is generally regarded as "the executive branch"
of the European Community and fulfils three major functions: (1) participation
in policy making by the Council (possessing the right of initiative to propose new
legislation), (2) administrative function, and (3) supervisory function.
8 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Registration and Operation within the Community of Certain Types of Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplanes
Which Have Been Modified and Recertificated as Meeting the Standards of Volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 3d ed. (July 1993), 1998 O.J. (C 118) 20 and 1998 O.J. (C 329) 10.
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1, 2002. The types of aircraft targeted are older aircraft that
have been "recertificated" to comply with the noise standards of
Chapter 39 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention.
Recertificated aircraft includes hushkitted aircraft, aircraft that
meet the Chapter 3 standard through operational restrictions
(weight restrictions or reduced flap settings), and aircraft re-engined with an engine that has a bypass ratio ("BPR") 10 lower
than 3.11
On April 29, 1999, the Council of the European Union
adopted the Regulation (the "Regulation")1 2 but indicated that
it would "postpone the date of application of the Regulation by
the concluone year in order to facilitate the continuation and
'3
sion of the consultations with the United States.'
The Regulation subjects aircraft registered in an EU Member
State to the non-addition rule. This rule prohibits Member
States from adding recertificated aircraft to their registers as of
May 4, 2000. Nevertheless, an aircraft registered in any Member
State before May 4, 2000, which has been registered in the Community ever since, will not be affected by the non-addition
rule. 14 EU aircraft can also be added to another EU Member
State's registry while non-EU aircraft cannot.
In addition, the Regulation introduces a non-operation rule,
aimed both at EU and third country carriers. Under the nonoperation rule, re-certificated aircraft are prohibited from operating in the territory of the Community as of April 1, 2002, unless they meet two conditions. These conditions require the
operator of an airplane to prove (1) that the plane was on the
9 "Chapter 2" and "Chapter 3" are the ICAO terms used outside the United
States while "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" are terms used by the United States and both
essentially refer to the same principles.
10 "Bypass ratio" (BPR) is an expression that relates the total mass of air drawn
into the engine to that portion of air that is used in the energy-release process of
burning fuel in the high-pressure core of the engine.
11 See Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 925/1999 of 29 April 1999
on the Registration and Operation Within the Community of Certain Types of
Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplanes Which Have Been Modified and Recertificated as
Meeting the Standards of Volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 3d ed. (July 1993) 1999 O.J. (L 120) 46,
Art. 2.2 [hereinafter "Regulation"].
12 See id.
1s Statement by the Council and the Commission joined to the Regulation,
adopted during the Industry Council on April 29, 1999 (visited Mar. 14, 2000)
<http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=l> (This statement can be found
by searching for "hushkit." Currently listed as "2174.COUNCIL-INDUSTRY.").
14 See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49.
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register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and (2) that it
operated in the Community between April 1, 1995, and May 4,
2000.15 To put EU aircraft at the same level as third country
aircraft, Article 3.4 imposes the same non-operation obligation
on EU aircraft.
The EU believes that the older planes, originally certificated
to meet the Chapter 2 standard and modified to improve their
noise certification level, not only cause more noise pollution but
17
also cause more gaseous emissions,' 6 and consume more fuel
than modern aircraft originally certificated to meet the Chapter
18
3 standard.

The growth of civil aviation in Europe 19 depends upon the
aviation industry's ability to progressively reduce the noise of
each individual aircraft movement since almost every airport in
Europe is at full noise capacity. 20 Recertificated aircraft disproportionately increase the cumulative noise load around Community airports and, accordingly, take up more noise capacity at
European airports than the modern "state of the art" aircraft.
By preventing the use of this older and noisier recertificated aircraft after April 2002, the Regulation is believed to create additional growth opportunity for the aviation industry by freezing
the number of recertificated aircraft at their 2000 level. 2 1
The United States strongly opposes the Regulation claiming it
would discriminate against U.S. carriers, hushkit and engine
manufacturers, and cost the U.S. industry at least two billion dollars.22 In particular, the United States Government argues that
hushkits reduce the noise emissions sufficiently and comply with
ICAO standards.
See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
See infra Part II.B.l.c.
17 See id.
18 See Regulation, Preamble
5, supra note 11, at 47.
19 See Assad Kotaite, Presentation by the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Dr. Assad Kotaite, of the Annual
Reports of the Council for 1995, 1996, 1997 and the Supplementary Report for
the First Six Months of 1998 During the 32nd Session of the Assembly (visited on
Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/a32pres-arsp.htm> (stating that the
ICAO member states' airlines are experiencing an average annual growth rate of
eight percent).
20 See ACI Europe, ACI Europe Position on Hushkitted Aircraft, Nov. 18, 1999.
21 See id.
22 See Congress Threatens No Stage 4 Agreement Unless EU Drops Hushkit Ban, AIR15
16

LINE FIN. NEWS,

Sept. 27, 1999.
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For several months now, the United States has called on the
EU to rescind the hushkit Regulation. Failure to repeal the Regulation could lead not only to the ban of the non-Stage 3 Concorde23 but could also jeopardize further negotiations within
ICAO on the next generation of noise standards, the so-called
Chapter 4 standard, that would answer
the long-term needs of
24
citizens who live near to airports.
On July 22, 1999, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution2 - to
push the U.S. State Department to lodge a complaint with ICAO
against the EU under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention so
that the top rulemaker in commercial aviation would rule on
whether the Regulation complies with international aviation
standards. 6 In addition, on September 23, 1999, the Aviation
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure drafted and approved a resolution 27 that reiterates the Senate's resolution and threatens to stop working on
the establishment of a Stage 4 noise abatement standard if the
hushkit Regulation is not rescinded. 8
No major progress has been made during the last months of
1999 and the beginning of 2000. On the contrary, persistent in
their points of views, the parties seem to head straight for conflict. On several occasions the EU offered to postpone the May
4 deadline and delay the implementation of the Regulation until at least September 2001, after the ICAO General Assembly, in
the hope that the United States will agree on the Chapter 4 standard which will render the EU hushkit Regulation obsolete. 29
Because the EU believes that it is very unlikely that the U.S. aviation industry will be in favor of a new noise standard that is even
23 See H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting the operation of the Concorde in the United States if the European Union does not rescind the hushkit
Regulation); see also Matthew Newman, EU Says Could Delay Ban On Aircraft "Hush
Kits", DOWJONEs NEws SERV., Oct. 7, 1999; Senate Wants ICAO to Rule on Validity of
Europe's Hushkit Ban, AVIATION DAILY, July 29, 1999, at 1.
24 See Paul Mann, U.S. May Up Hushkit Skirmish, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 1, 2000, at 30.
25 See Unanimous-Consent Agreement, Amendment No. 1342, 145 CONG. REc.
S9046, S9048 (1999).
26 See Senate Wants ICAO To Rule On Validity Of Europe's Hushkit Ban, AVIATION
DAILY, July 29, 1999, at 1.
27 See H. R. Con. Res. 187, 106th Cong. (1999).
28 See Congressional Committee Fires First Shot in Airport Noise Battle, WORLD AIRPORT WK., Sept. 28, 1999.
29

European Airports Champion Ban on Chapter 2 Aircraft, COMMUTER/REGIONAL

AIRLINE NEWS, Jan.

3, 2000.

334

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

stricter than the one set by the hushkit Regulation,3 ° the EU is
willing to withdraw the Regulation only if the United States gives
a written commitment to support the adoption of the stricter
Chapter 4 noise standard. The United States, however, says that
it is not willing to negotiate under duress 31 and that writing the
criteria and definition of the Stage 4 standard would render the
current aircraft equipment prematurely obsolete. 2
Because the United States has not given any firm commitment
to develop the Chapter 4 standard, the EU intends to keep the
Regulation in place until the General Assembly of ICAO meets
in September 2001. 33 Loyola de Palacio, 34 the new vice-presi-

dent of the European Commission who is also in charge of energy and transport policy, points out that even if the EU would
be willing to delay the implementation of the Regulation, the
delay would be complicated by the new Treaty of Amsterdam,
under which many regulations not only require approval from
the 15 EU Member States but also from the European Parliament. Because the European Parliament has the reputation of
being much "greener" than the EU governments, a Commission
decision delaying the application of the Regulation for at least
another year could be seriously jeopardized. 5
In order to get out of the current deadlock situation, the State
Department is expected to effectively lodge a complaint with the
ICAO in mid-March. 6 Once the ICAO receives the complaint it
will review the legal arguments, translate the complaint into six
United Nations languages and distribute it to the 33 members of
the ICAO Council. The EU will have 90 days for a rebuttal and
- See Paul Mann, Diplomacy Takes Hold In Hushkit Squabble-Washington and
BrusselsJockey for Advantage in Their Dispute Over Aircraft Noise Reduction, AVIATION
WY. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 20, 1999, at 45.
31 Geoff Winestock, et al., A Special Background Report on European Union Business
and Polities,WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
32 See Mann, supra note 24, at 30.
33 See European Commission Welcomes New Prospectsfor Progress on Stricter Aircraft
Noise Abatement, PR NEWSWiRE, Oct. 7, 1999; see also Mann, supra note 24, at 30.
34 As of September 17, 1999, a new European Commission was confirmed in
office. The function of Commissioner for Transport, previously held by Neil Kinnock, was taken over by Loyola de Palacio. Ms. Loyola de Palacio serves as vicepresident of the European Commission as well as Commissioner for Transport
and Energy.
35 See Geoff Winestock & Brandon Mitchener, U.S., EU Face Deadline on American Planes - Noise-Pollution Regulation Could Bar Many Aircraft From European Skies,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 11, 1999, at Al8.
36 The author completed this Article during February 2000 and accordingly
does not yet know the outcome of the above-mentioned complaint.
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then ICAO will decide how to proceed, with mediation or a full
trial being two of the range of options available. 7 A decision for
the United States could force the EU to drop the hushkit Regulation or effectively give up its voting rights within ICAO .3 In
retaliation for the United States filing the Article 84 complaint,
the EU has threatened to enact the ban immediately
reducing
39
the likelihood of a settlement even more.
The goal of this paper is to assess the compatibility of the Regulation with the international obligations of the EU and/or its
Member States under existing multilateral and bilateral
agreements. 40
Part I provides background information on the dispute, beginning with a brief explanation of how aircraft noise is generated and ending with a discussion on how international treaties,
such as the Chicago Convention, or international organizations,
such as the EU, have tried to solve this problem.
Part II summarizes the positions of the United\States government and the European Union with regard to the legality and
defensibility of the Regulation and provides two aircraft noise
studies.
Part III gives an overview of problems faced by airports in the
EU and the U.S.
Part TV looks at the compatibility of the Regulation with the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") 41 and with the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") .42
Part V examines whether the EU and its Member States are
complying with their Chicago Convention obligations and their
s7 Kristin S. Krause, Line in the Sand, TRAImc WORLD, Feb. 7, 2000.
38 James Cox, Hush Kit Ban Raises Ante in U.S.-EU Trade War, USA TODAY, Dec.
23, 1999, at 3B.
- See Krause, supra note 37.
4 The author does not examine in detail the technical side of this problem,
except where technical reports and findings are inextricably linked to the discussion of legal issues.
41 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-6
(Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
42 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Doc. MTN/FA 1I-AIB (Dec. 15,
1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994).

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

336

bilateral obligations with the United States by enacting the
Regulation.
Part VI proposes several alternatives and/or modifications to
the Regulation in order to make it (more) compatible with the
international obligations of the EU under the Chicago Convention, the bilateral air services agreements, and the TBT
Agreement.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. AIRCRAFT NOISE
Aircraft noise heard on the ground comes from three different sources. First, the noise is a mixture of sources originating
within the aircraft engines and those produced by the jet exhausts, where high-velocity gases are propelled into the atmospheric air ('Jet noise")." An additional source of noise occurs
on final approach to land, with the engines at low power and
creating minimum noise. At that moment, aerodynamic disturbances caused by the deployment of the flaps and undercarriage
produce a significant source of "airframe" noise.44
The noise generated within the engine is mainly high-frequency whereas the jet noise and the airframe noise are lowfrequency.45 Low-frequency noise sources travel large distances
from the aircraft and are noticed most by people living in airport surroundings. 46
The intensity of the noise from a jet is a function of jet velocity to a high power, which is typically around eight. A halving or
doubling of jet velocity, therefore, can be responsible for a
change of some twenty decibels ("dB") in source noise output,
equivalent to a fourfold change in loudness or annoyance. Engine bypass ratio ("BPR") 47 dictates the velocity of the jet exhaust flow and is fundamental to the production of noise in the
mixing process with the atmosphere. Efficiency increases and
jet exhaust noise decreases for normal subsonic flight opera43 See Planes Getting Quieter; Noise Standard in Effect Jan. 1, CINCINNATI POST,
Dec. 21, 1999, at 7A; see also M.J.T. Smith, Final Report, Study on the Assessment
of the Environmental Performance of Recertificated Chapter 3 Aircraft Compared to Aircraft Initially Manufactured to Chapter 3 Standards: Recertificated
Aircraft and the Environment: An Opinion 10 (April 1999) (unpublished study,
on file with the European Commission).
44 See Smith, supra note 43, at 10.

45 See id.
46 See id.
47 For

a definition, see supra note 10.
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tions as bypass ratio increases, and less fuel is used by unit of
overall thrust.4"
B.

THE EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT NOISE ON HUMAN HEALTH

There is ample medical evidence that excessive noise in general, and aerial noise in particular, cause mental disorders and
other detrimental psychological effects on human beings.49
Specifically, aircraft noise leads to an increase in chronic fatigue
and neurotic complaints.5" Indeed, some studies have found
that the blood pressure and stress-related cholesterol levels rise
and irritability and fatigue increase when someone is exposed to
excessive noise levels for several hours. 1 In addition, according
to one study, children exposed to frequent aircraft noise at
school did not learn as well
as other children who go to school
52
in a quieter environment.
C.

THE REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT NOISE

The regulation of aircraft noise can take place at various
'political' levels (internationally, nationally, or at a local level by
airport communities) and at three different stages:
(a) limitations on the certification of new designs and engines are used to control and restrain the manufacturers (nonproduction rule);
(b) national legislation may introduce restrictions on the acquisition and/or on the registration of noisy aircraft by their airlines (non-addition rule);
(c) airlines may be prevented from operating noisy aircraft or
be subject to some form of noise restriction (daily time curfews,
for example) by local airport regulations (non-operation
rule) .'
See Smith, supra note 43, at 11.
49 See R.I.R. Abeyratne, Aircraft Engine Emissions and Noise, 24 ENVTL. POL'Y & L.
48

238, 241 (1994).
50 See ALEXANDER COHEN, NOISE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE 25 (1968); see also
Donald V. Harper, Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports: Past, Present, and
Future, 17 TRANsp. L.J. 117, 121 (1988).

51 See Peter Gruner, Now Hear This: Noises of the City Can Cause Heart Failure,
EVENING STANDARD-LONDON, Oct. 9, 1998, at 18.
52 See id.
53 CAROLE BLAc sHAw, AVIATION LAW & REGULATION

229-41 (1992).

338

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

1.

The InternationalRegulation of Aircraft Noise: The Chicago
Convention

Given the enormous importance of air transport during the
Second World War, nations realized that the development of
uniform rules in international civil aviation was necessary to secure international peace. At the initiative of the United States
Government, an International Civil Aviation Conference was
held in Chicago in November 1944. The Convention on International Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention")5 4 was adopted at
this meeting. National security reasons and economic protectionism made absolute state sovereignty,5 5 as well as the equal
right of all signatories to participate in international air transportation, 6 the core principles of the Chicago Convention.57
The Chicago Convention introduced guidelines for flight
over the territory of signatory States, aircraft nationality and
ownership as well as air navigation rules. 58 The Chicago Convention also created the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") to foster the planning and development of
international air transport.
ICAO created the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection ("CAEP") 5 1 in 1983 primarily to address environmental
problems connected with the increasing significance of air
transport. CAEP is also charged with making recommendations
regarding noise and emissions to the Council of ICAO.60
54

See Chicago Convention, supra note 5.

55 See Chicago Convention, Art. 1, supra note 5.
56 See Chicago Convention, Art. 44 (f), supra note 5.
57 See Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Public InternationalAir Law: Examining Its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industry, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 425, 430-434 (1996); see also Benoit M.J. Swinnen, An
Opportunityfor Trans Atlantic Civil Aviation: From Open Skies to Open Markets?, 63 J.
AIR L. & COM. 249, 254 (1997).
-s See Heather L. Miller, Civil Aircraft Emissions and International Treaty Law, 63

J. AIR L. & COM. 697, 706 (1998).
59 The Member States participating in the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Observers in CAEP are: Greece; Airports Council International-ACI; Arab Civil
Aviation Commission-ACAC; Commission of the European Communities-EC; International Air Transport Association-IATA; International Coordinating Council
of Aerospace Industries Associations-ICCAIA; International Federation of Air
Line Pilots' Associations-IFALPA; World Meteorological Organization-WMO. See
Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://

www.icao.org/icao/en/env/CAEPMEM.HTM>.
- See Miller, supra note 58, at 714.
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The Council, which is the governing body of ICAO, adopts
International Standards and Recommended Practices
("SARPs"). SARPs are subsequently incorporated into Annexes
to the Chicago Convention.61 SARPS relating to environmental
aspects of aviation were first adopted on April 2, 1971, and designated as Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, entitled "Environmental Protection."62 Annex 16 was adopted following the
recommendations of the "Special Meeting on Aircraft Noise in
the Vicinity of Aerodromes," held in 1969.63 Volume I of Annex
16 includes provisions for the uniform measurement of aircraft
noise levels and noise certification standards that govern any aircraft currently built. Volume II sets forth aircraft engine emissions standards.
Volume I of Annex 16 distinguishes jet-powered aircraft along
three levels of stringency. Chapter 1 refers to non-noise certificated ("NNC") airplanes and includes all aircraft that cannot
comply with Chapter 2 standards, including most types of Boeing-707, McDonnell Douglas DC-8, Convairs, Caravelles, and Tridents. Most of these airplanes are obsolete in many parts of the
world because of age and because they do not comply with current noise regulations.64
Chapter 2 of Volume I of Annex 16 introduces the first noise
stringency standards. It applies to brand-new first-time certificated jet aircraft, i.e., aircraft for which the application for a certificate of airworthiness for the prototype was accepted (the socalled prototype certification) or another equivalent procedure
had been carried out before October 6, 1977. Several aircraft
types receive exceptional treatment under Chapter 2. The "effective perceived noise level" (EPNdB) measures the noise level,
and Chapter 2 precludes aircraft from exceeding a certain maxi-

61
62

See Chicago Convention, Art. 34, 54(1), supra note 5, at 1189, 1197.
See Abeyratne, supra note 49, at 242.

63 See Jeffrey Goh, Problems of Transnational Regulation: A Case Study of Aircraft
Noise Regulation in the European Community, 23 TRANSp. L. J. 277, 284 (1995).

64 The U.S. introduced an operational ban on Stage 1 aircraft effective January
1, 1985, while most European countries banned Chapter 1 aircraft effective January 1, 1988. Unlike the US., many European countries granted exemptions to
developing countries until December 31, 1989. See Council Directive 83/206/
EEC of 21 April 1983 amending Directive 80/51/EEC on the Limitation of Noise
Emissions from Subsonic Aircraft, 1983 O.J. (L 117) 15; see also, 14 C.F.R. part
91, Subpart I, Operating Noise Limits, Sec. 91-805.
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mum EPNdB at specific moments. Chapter 2 also contains detailed technical procedures to calculate these noise standards.65
Chapter 3 applies more stringent standards to aircraft
designed after October 6, 1977. Accordingly, many aircraft do
not meet these standards. For example, Chapter 3 excludes
Boeing-727s, Boeing-737-200s,
McDonell Douglas DC-9s and
66
OOs.
Boeing-737-1
The EU is of the opinion that the Chapter 3 standard, which
was adopted more than twenty years ago (1977), no longer reflects the latest engine technology. Indeed, according to ICAO
CAEP/3, the purpose of noise certification is "to ensure that the
latest available noise reduction technology is incorporated into
the aircraft design. '6 7 The noise limits contained in the Chapter
3 standard have not been adapted during the past twenty years
despite the spectacular improvements in engine noise control
that now provide substantially lower noise levels.68 Apparently,
aircraft are manufactured today that are twenty three dB quieter
than the baseline Chapter 3 standard.69
In 1990, the ICAO General Assembly adopted a resolution allowing states that have noise problems to start phasing out operations by Chapter 2 aircraft between 1995 and 2002.70 In
addition, at the request of several environmental groups and local airport communities, the EU significantly pressured the
other parties of ICAO to make the current Chapter 3 standard
more stringent. Between 1992 and 1998, all progress on this
issue had been halted primarily by the United States and the
African States.71 Contrary to the EU's expectations and despite
three years of preparatory technical work, the members of
CAEP/3 were unable to reach a consensus on a new noise stan-

65 For a detailed discussion on the noise certification process, see Troy A. Rolf,
InternationalAircraft Noise Certification, 165J. AIR L. & CoM. 383 (2000).
- See BtcKsHrAw, supra note 53, 238-39.
67 ICAO COMMITTEE ON AVIATION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, THIRD MEET-

ING,

1.5.6 (1995) [hereinafter CAEP/3].

See Smith, supra note 43, at 5-6.
69 See Philippe Harmon, Letters to the Editor, Put a Muffler on That Plane,WALL
ST.J. EUR., Oct. 12, 1999, at 11.
70 See ICAO, Aircraft Noise, (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/
en/env/noise.htm>.
71 See European Commission, Transport Directorate-general, InformationPack Aircraft Noise: The Recertificated Aircraft Regulation, 1-16, Aug. 26, 1999, at 1-16
[hereinafter Information Pack].
68
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dard.72 The EU claims that the United States requested that this
issue not be given priority on CAEP's work agenda. v3
In conclusion, the international aviation community has
merely reached a consensus allowing member states to restrict
the operation of all aircraft that do not meet the Chapter 3 standard, as of April 1, 2002. TM Due to the lack of progress within
CAEP, however, the international aviation community has yet to
agree on a policy to reduce noise after the 2002 deadline. Indeed, at the last CAEP/4 meeting in 1998, no agreement was
reached on the future Chapter 4 noise standards. 75 Taking into
account the current heightened tensions between the United
States and the EU, it remains to be seen whether the CAEP
member states will be able to agree on the stricter Chapter 4
noise standard at the next ICAO General Assembly in September 2001.
2.

The Problem and the Regulation of Aircraft Noise within the
European Union
a. The Aircraft Noise Problem in the European Union
European citizens are increasingly protesting against the rising noise pollution around Community airports, which are often
located close to densely populated urban communities.7 6 Indeed, Europe has far worse noise problems than the United
77
States so the issue of stricter noise standards is more poignant.
Even Congressman James Oberstar (D-Minn.), one of the acknowledged aviation specialists on Capitol Hill, recognized that
Europe's comparative shortage of geographic space compels Europe's urban population to live closer to airports than do U.S.
citizens.78
According to Dave Tompkins, head of operations for the
United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority, governments ur72

16,

See ICAO, ICAO 32nd Assembly - Report of the Executive Committee, (visited Jan.
2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/a32report.htm>
[hereinafter

ICAO Executive Committee].
73 See Information Pack, supra note 71.
74

See ICAO, Resolutions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the Assembly, Resolution

A32-8-App. D

(visited Jan.

16, 2000)

<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/a32/

resolutions.pdf>.
75 See ICAO Executive Committee, supra note 72.
76

For example, the French National Association Against Aircraft Noise and

Pollution.
77 See Lori Lessner, European Efforts to Regulate Airplane Noise Spark U.S. Outcry,
WICHITA EAGLE, Sept. 18, 1999.
78 See Mann, supra note 30, at 45-46.
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gently need to take steps to quiet aircraft since almost every European airport is at capacity. If the noise is not dealt with
adequately, Tompkins fears that individual airports will take action since noise abatement measures are urgently necessary to
allow airports to implement their expansion plans.79
In addition, Airports Council International Europe ("ACI-Europe"), which represents 450 commercial airports in Europe,
fully supports the enforcement of the EU's Regulation 0 and
also considers the Regulation to be necessary for the growth of
the aviation sector.8 1
Accordingly, the threat is that if the EU did not enact the current measure, individual Member States, at the request of local
airport communities, might unilaterally impose noise restrictions that threaten the European market as a single economic
entity in the field of civil aviation. 2 Several countries have already taken such unilateral measures. For example, in August
1996, the UK Government decided unilaterally to impose noise
limits at three London airports: Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted. 3 Similarly, on October 21, 1996, the Italian Environment
Ministry introduced a series of similar measures aimed at quelling noise around the airports of Fiumicino in Rome and
Malpensa in Milan. Another more recent example of such unilateral action is the Belgian Government's decision of early February to reduce aircraft noise for takeoffs between 11 p.m. and 6
a.m. by thirty percent by July 2003.84 Other countries in Eu79 Stage 4 Noise Restriction Will Be Law Sooner Than Later: FAA, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
Sept. 20, 1999.
8o See Statement Approved by the Board of ACI Europe at Their Meeting in
Vienna on 20 January 1999, European Airports support Community initiative to
restrict the use of hushkitted aircraft, Feb. 4, 1999; see also Harmon, supranote 69.
8] See Pollution Online, European Airports Agree With EU on Hush Kit Ban (visited
Jan. 31, 2000) <http://news.pollutiononline.com/wires/article.asp?DocID={
BC2AB848-F5 1B-1 1D2-A405-00C04F4F7C39}>.
82 See European Union, EU TransportMinisters Postpone Hushkit Issue (visited Jan.
31, 2000) <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1999/1999014.htm>.
83 See Dr. Pablo Mendes de Leon, Aviation and the Environment: ChangingPerceptions, 22 AiR & SPACE L. 131, 131 (1997).
84 Nancy Nackaerts, Belgian Govt To Reduce Aircraft Noise By 30% By July
2003, Dow JONES NEWS SERV. Feb. 11, 2000. Early January 2000, Belgian's transport minister, Isabelle Durant, had published a draft law banning all flights to
and from Brussels airport between 1 am and 5 am as of 2003. Due to fierce
protest from DHL, which has its world-wide headquarters and European airfreight hub in Brussels, and other cabinet members, Ms. Durant had to withdraw
the draft bill. The government nevertheless decided to introduce measures to
curb aircraft noise at Brussels National Airport. The Government plans to phase
in noise quotas on nighttime flights that will become gradually stricter. SeeJohn
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rope, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark
took, or are intending to take, similar unilateral actions.
As mentioned above, the EU has been advocating the adoption of stricter noise standards within ICAO since 1992. Because
no progress has been made so far, and in response to strong
environmental pressures within the fifteen Member States, especially in Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Spain,86
the EU decided to at least restrain hushkitted aircraft from disproportionately taking up noise capacity at Europe's airports.
b.

The Regulation of Aircraft Noise within the European
Union

The Regulation represents another step in the EU's continuous effort to combat the detrimental effect of noise on the environment. As early as 1973, the EU adopted its first
environmental action program. The program officially recognized noise as a severe environmental problem.87 The fifth action program of 1992 on the environment supports the
adoption of further measures aimed at reducing noise emissions
from aircraft.
The acknowledgment of aircraft noise as a serious source of
noise pollution led to the adoption of four European directives.88 These Directives were all enacted with a view to implementing the ICAO standards, contained in Volume I of Annex
16.89

Concerned that the air transport industry is growing faster
than the technological and operational devices designed to reduce its harmful environmental effects, Loyola de Palacio and
Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom announced in
December 1999 a framework for a new environmental policy to
improve environmental standards, in particular noise and emission pollution.90
Carreyrou, Brussels Tempers light Ban-DHL Welcomes New Government Measures To
Curb Aircraft Noise at Night, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2000.
85 See Mendes de Leon, supra note 83 at 131.
86 See Europe Considers Delaying Hushkit Ban, AVIATION DAiLY, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1.
87 See Goh, supra note 63, at 286.
88 See Council Directive 80/51/EEC, 1979 Oj. (L 18) 26; Council Directive
83/206/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 117) 15; Council Directive 89/629/EEC 1989 O.J. (L
363) 27; Council Directive 92/14/EEC, 1992 Oj. (L 76) 21, as amended by
Council Directive 98/20/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 107) 4.
89 See Goh, supra note 63, at 287.
90 See EU Commission Pushes Own Agenda, WORLD AiRUNE NEWS, Dec. 3, 1999.
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At airport level, aircraft noise will be addressed through the
creation of a Community framework on the noise classification
of aircraft. This system tries to unify the levels of charges, currently being levied at some European airports to deter the use of
noisy aircraft, by creating a common noise classification scheme.
In addition, the Commission proposes a noise measurement index, a methodology for noise calculation and a minimum requirement for noise monitoring. The idea behind all this it to
give preference to operations with quieter aircraft when defining priority criteria for re-allocation from the pool of slots.91
The Commission hopes that a system of overall noise quotas at
individual airports will push airlines to use quieter aircraft in
92
order to obtain slots.
c.

The Disputed EU Hushkit Regulation

The Regulation establishes conditions for registration and operation of recertificated aircraft in the European Community.
According to Article 2 of the Regulation, recertificated aircraft
includes aircraft initially certificated to Chapter 2 or equivalent
standards, or initially not noise-certificated but modified
through technical measures, including hushkits, engine modifications or other technical measures, or through operational restrictions, such as weight restrictions and reduced flap settings.9"
However, aircraft that have been modified to meet the Chapter
3 standard by being completely reengined with engines having a
bypass ratio 94 of three or more are not to be considered as recertificated aircraft. A contrario, this means that aircraft reengined
with engines having a bypass ratio of less than three are to be
treated as recertificated aircraft.
The Regulation introduces a "non-addition" and a "non-operation" rule. The non-addition rule prohibits EU Member States
from adding recertificated aircraft to their registers after May 4,
2000."5 A recertificated aircraft, however, that was on the register of an EU Member State before May 4, 2000 can be transferred to the national register of another EU Member State
91 See Graham Dunn, EC Details Plansfor Tough Environmental Rules, AIR
Dec. 3, 1999.

PORT INTELLIGENCE,
92 See id.

93 See Regulation, Art. 2.2, supra note 11, at 48.
94 For a definition of bypass ratio, see supra note 10.
95 See Regulation, Art. 3.1, supra note 11, at 49.
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without losing its right to operate into the Community after
April 1, 2002.96
The Regulation also introduces a non-operation rule. Under
this rule, non-complying third country aircraft are prohibited
from operating in the territory of the Community after April 1,
2002, unless the airline can prove that the aircraft was on the
register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and had a history
of Community operations between April 1, 1995, and May 4,
2000." 7 To ensure non-discriminatory treatment of all aircraft,
the Regulation applies the same non-operation rule after April
1, 2002, to aircraft registered in an EC Member State, 98 except
that transferred aircraft from the register of one Member State
to another Member State is still allowed to operate. 99
II.

THE EUROPEAN UNION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES
A.

1.

SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

The United States's Position

The United States Government, acting on behalf of its carriers, and hushkit and engine manufacturers, opposes the EU
Regulation on several grounds:
a.

Compatibility with the Chicago Convention

By unilaterally imposing a stricter noise standard than the
standard specified in Chapter 3 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention, the United States claims that the EU and
its Member States are violating their obligations under the Chicago Convention and under the bilateral air services agreements
concluded with the U.S.
In particular, the Regulation allegedly violates Article 33 of
the Chicago Convention and similar articles of the bilateral air
service agreements because it refuses to give universal recognition to U.S. certificates of airworthiness despite U.S. carriers'
compliance with all current ICAO standards.
In addition, the United States claims that the measure gives
Airbus, the European manufacturing consortium, a boost over
96

97
98

9

See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49.
See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
See Regulation, Art. 3.4, supra note 11, at 49.
See Statement of the Council's Reasons, 1998 O.J. (c 404) 5, 5.
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Boeing in aircraft sales100 and favors EU carriers over U.S. carriers contrary to the non-discrimination obligation of Article 15 of
the Chicago Convention and similar articles of the bilateral air
services agreements, which oblige both parties to give each
other's carriers a fair and equal opportunity to compete.
In particular, the transfer rule (as described above) would require EU carriers to buy second-hand aircraft from other Member States instead of from non-European carriers. NonEuropean carriers will refrain from buying older aircraft from
U.S. carriers if such aircraft can no longer be operated in the
territory of the EU. This diminishes the value of the commercial U.S. fleet and allegedly is contrary to the rationale of the
standardization process carried out within the framework of
ICAO (allowing a certain degree of comparability and interchangeability of air transport related products).1 ° 1
b.

The Shortened Phase-out of Chapter 2 Aircraft

The United States claims that the decision to phase out Chapter 2 aircraft by 2000 (15 months ahead of the April 2002 ICAO
deadline) 102 had only a negligible effect on business decisions of
U.S. air carriers whether or not to invest in hushkits or in more
expensive, new technology engines. Contrary to the EU allegations, the United States asserts that the extra 15 months allowed
by ICAO would not have induced U.S. carriers to invest in new
aircraft rather than in lower cost hushkitted technology.
c.

The Alleged Losses

The United States alleges that the Regulation has already cost
American businesses $2.1 billion (1.97 billion euros)I 3 in spare
parts and engine sales, reduced the commercial resale value of
100SeeJames Cox, Hush Kit Ban Raises Ante in U.S.-EU Trade War, USA TODAY,
Dec. 23, 1999, at 3B.
101SeeJacques Nusbaumer, The GATT Standards Code in Operation, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 542, 549 (1984).
102 To combat aviation noise, the U.S. Congress passed Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388-378 (codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-33 (1994)). This law requires
certain categories of aircraft to be fully Stage 3 compliant by December 31, 1999,
15 months ahead of the ICAO deadline.
103 Aerospace Industries Association alleges that U.S. companies, including the
Pratt & Whitney unit of United Technologies Corp., the Nordam Group, and B.
F. Goodrich Co., have already suffered $2.1 billion (1.97 billion euros) in airline
fleet depreciation and lost sales as a result of the mere threat of the rule. In
particular, Pratt & Whitney, the principal manufacturer of American-made
hushkits, estimates that it will lose $515 million in orders as a result of the EU
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over 1,600 U.S. aircraft, and caused financial losses for U.S.
hushkit manufacturers.1 4 The internationally agreed aircraft
certification scheme of ICAO assures investors of the worldwide
marketability for the life of an aircraft. Despite the one year
delay, the intended unilateral deviation by the EU from the
ICAO certification scheme allegedly has already delayed substantial investments.
d.

The Noise Issue

According to U.S. technical experts, aircraft equipped with
hushkits would make far less noise than some originally certificated aircraft. In addition, the United States questions the validity of the criteria of a bypass ratio of 3 in order to distinguish
between permitted and prohibited reengined aircraft.
e.

Performance Standard Versus Design Standard

If the European Union is really concerned about the environmental pollution produced by aircraft, the United States argues
that it should introduce a performance standard rather than a
design standard, in compliance with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
2.

The Position of the European Union

The European Union presents several arguments to defend
the validity of its Regulation.
a.

Compatibility with the Chicago Convention

The EU claims that it did not violate the Chicago Convention
or its bilateral air service agreements because it merely freezes
existing noise levels around Community airports. Indeed, the
measure only prevents countries from continuing to add aircraft
to their registers that only marginally comply with the Chapter 3
standard. The Regulation, however, still allows such "noisy" airban. See Congress Threatens No Stage 4 Agreement Unless EU Drops Hushkit Ban, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999.
104 See Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc. against The Council of the European Union and the Governments of the 15 EU Member States before the Department of Transportation, Docket OST-99-; see also U.S. House Transp. &
Infrastructure Comm., Hollings, Oberstar Bills Would Halt Concorde Flights in U.S.
Airspace-Action in Response to E.U. noise policy-House T&I Committee will mark-up
Thursday, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/transportationdemocrats/press/990210_concorde.htm>.
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craft currently serving Community airports to further operate
into the Community after April 1, 2002.
In addition, the recertification process of hushkitted aircraft
is contrary to the purpose of the ICAO noise certification rules,
i.e., to ensure that the latest available noise reduction technol10 5
ogy is incorporated in the aircraft design.
And last, because the non-operation rule applies both to EU
and U.S. carriers, the EU claims that the Regulation does not
violate Article 15 of the Chicago Convention or the "fair and
equal opportunity to compete" obligation of the bilateral air
10 6
services agreements.
b.

The Shortened Phase-out of Chapter 2 Aircraft

The EU argues that the U.S. administration has caused the
difficulties that U.S. carriers are currently encountering by unilaterally anticipating the deadline to phase out Chapter 2 standard aircraft by 2000.107 These stricter time limits pushed U.S.
carriers to opt for the cheap hushkit solution rather than to invest in new, less noisy, more environmentally friendly aircraft.
In addition, the use of hushkits is not consistent with the purpose of the ICAO standard in terms of overall noise reduction
through the best available technology. 0 8 If the EU would withdraw the measure, the condition would be an expeditious development and implementation of the Chapter 4 standard. The
problems currently faced by U.S. carriers and manufacturers
would simply be delayed since these aircraft will be obsolete
within two or three years. James Erickson, director of the Office
of Environment and Energy of the Federal Aviation Administration, pointed out that the Stage 4 noise standard will need to be
implemented much quicker than the Stage 3, for which airlines
were granted almost 10 years. The deadline could even be
See CAEP/3, supra note 67, at
1.5.6.
For example, Article 11 of the Air Transport Agreement between the
United States and Luxembourg, signed at Luxembourg Aug. 19, 1986, and entered into force Aug. 3, 1988. DOS: 88-252; TIAS: TIAS 11249.
107 In particular, the U.S. set forth three progressive compliance levels for aircraft to meet by the end of 1994, 1996, and 1998 during the interim period. See
49 U.S.C. §47528 (1999), Prohibition on Operating Certain Aircraft not Complying with Stage 3 noise levels; 14 C.F.R. part 91, Subpart I, Operating Noise Limits,
Sec. 91-865.
108 See CAEP/3, supra note 67, at
1.5.6.
105
106
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within five years, according to Erickson, which would force airlines to spend billions of dollars to upgrade their fleets.' 0 9
c.

The Alleged Losses

The EU alleges that the United States is unable to provide
sufficient evidence that the Regulation would cost two billion
dollars to the U.S. aviation industry. First, U.S. carriers allegedly
only operate a limited number of hushkitted aircraft between
the United States and the EU.
Second, the Regulation has only a limited impact on the resale market of older aircraft because such aircraft are in any
event at or close to the end of their economic life.
Third, the EU hushkit Regulation is only one of the reasons
why airlines start to update their fleets. The replacement of
older Chapter 2 aircraft by Chapter 3 aircraft is also economically advantageous to airlines. Many airlines start replacing
Chapter 2 aircraft because of the benefits gained from higher
daily utilization rates and lower maintenance and direct operating costs of first-time certificated Chapter 3 aircraft. 110 Another
factor pushing airlines to replace older aircraft are stringent and
costly regulations. Many airlines seem concerned with recent
and pending Federal Aviation Administration regulations mandating more careful inspections of components, wiring, and fuel
systems of older aircraft that would further increase maintenance costs."'
d.

The Noise Issue

The EU adduces significant evidence" 12 to prove that the
noise emission levels as well as the gaseous emissions performances and fuel consumption of recertificated aircraft are significantly worse than that of current technology aircraft originally
109 Indeed, the proposals being discussed by the ICAO working parties range

from no action at all to a ban on Chapter 3 compliant aircraft as early as 2011.
See Chapter 4 Noise Proposals Start to Enter Residual Value Calculations, AIRCRAFr
VALuE NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999.
110 Hawaiian Airlines management decided to replace its existing DC-9 fleet
with 13 Boeing 717s because the higher daily utilization, lower maintenance, and
direct operating costs are expected to save it $200 million over 10 years. These
prospects of lower maintenance and direct operating costs encouraged TWA,
Delta Air Lines, Air Tran, and American Airlines to make similar fleet replacement decisions. See Edward Tripp, Capacity, Cost, Noise Issues Accelerate FleetReplacements, AERO SAFETY & MAINTENANCE, Oct. 29, 1999, at 4.
-1 See id. at 4.
112 See infra Part III.A.
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certificated to meet the Chapter 3 standard. Accordingly, in order to prevent a further deterioration of the noise situation, environmental groups have lobbied hard for the adoption of this
Regulation.
In addition, the EU maintains that the goal of this Regulation
is to preserve the opportunities for further growth in air traffic
in Europe to the benefit of all carriers, including U.S.
carriers.113
e.

Performance Versus Design Standard

The EU asserts that the use of a design standard is not explicitly prohibited by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(see below).
B.

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Recertificated ex-Chapter 2 aircraft undeniably incorporate
older and often outdated technology. Some of the designs date
back to the 1960s. In order to meet the Chapter 3 standard,
these aircraft are modified through technical measures, such as
hushkits, engine modifications or replacements, or through operational restrictions such as weight restrictions and reduced
flap settings. Even if these measures reduce the noise pollution
to some extent, recertificated aircraft still have a worse noise
performance, weight for weight, than first-time certificated
Chapter 3 aircraft. Studies carried out on both sides of the Atlantic as well as local measures taken by airports in the EU and
in the United States clearly support this.
1. Study on the Assessment of the EnvironmentalImpact of
Recertificated Chapter 3 Aircraft Versus "First-time"
14
Certificated Chapter 3 Aircraft
An independent study carried out at the request of the European Commission concludes that aircraft designed from the outset to satisfy Chapter 3 are superior in all environmental
respects to recertificated aircraft, except where an aircraft is totally reengined with a modern high bypass ratio turbofan. In
addition, noise certification results suggest that the dividing line
See Information Pack, supra note 71.
This chapter is entirely based on a study, carried out by M.J.T. Smith for the
European Commission. See Smith, supra note 43.
113
114
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between "noisy" low bypass and "quiet" high bypass engines is
situated close to a bypass ratio of 3.
This study asserts that the recertification process of original
Chapter 2 aircraft necessitates limits on the maximum takeoff
weight and/or changes to operational procedures as well as engineering modifications in order to satisfy the Chapter 3 standard. These changes made to recertificated or hushkitted
aircraft, including partial or complete engine replacement with
low bypass ratio jet engines, do not reduce noise sufficiently to
produce aircraft that complies with the certification standards
with the same margins as aircraft originally certificated to Chapter 3. Accordingly, these ex-Chapter 2 aircraft are not nearly as
quiet as the more modern aircraft in everyday operation.
While the claims of proponents of recertification through
hushkitting or reengining may well be valid, they ignore the vital
underlying issue that if the older aircraft were retired early in
2002, as intended, they would be replaced by modern counterparts that are better with respect to noise, fuel efficiency, and
exhaust emissions than the designs that date back to the 1960s.
Modern turbofan-powered aircraft of equivalent size as the
older low bypass aircraft they replace generate a minimum of 5
EPNdB average improvement over hushkitted types. A 5dB reduction in noise reduces the takeoff noise footprint area by
more than 50%. Modern counterparts often achieve a further
5dB noise reduction, which would equate to a reduction in the
basic noise contour area (zone around airport affected by aircraft noise) by around 80%. These modern aircraft also have a
much better fuel efficiency rate and produce less exhaust gas
emissions than the older aircraft.
a.

Noise Certification
Although the purpose of noise certification is to ensure that
the latest available noise reduction technology is incorporated
into the aircraft design, the Chapter 3 noise standard was introduced 20 years ago, before the main benefits of such technology
had been incorporated into the aircraft product. In addition,
during these past 20 years, the Chapter 3 standard has not been
adapted to reflect the new improvements in engine noise control and in other general engine and airframe technologies.
The current "state of the art" aircraft, in which the latest technology has been built-in, often have substantial margins with respect to the Chapter 3 standard while hushkitted aircraft have
not. The increase in the stringency of the noise standard is
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therefore a high priority on the agenda of CAEP/5 in 2001.
The CAEP will have to address the issue of how the Chapter 3
framework can be made more representative of modern operating conditions and present-day noise disturbance around airports. The distances of the basic three reference points
(Lateral, Flyover, and Approach) 115 were adjusted in the 1960s
to permit aircraft to reach the same maximum 108EPNdB at
each point. Therefore, compliance with Chapter 3 is not necessarily a true indication of how quiet an aircraft appears to residents living around airports.
Many hushkitted aircraft are "shoehorned" into compliance
with Chapter 3 by taking advantage of the "trade-off' allowance
between the three reference points of the noise certification
process. Within the individual limit of 2 EPNdB, an excess at
one or two of the reference points can be compensated by a
compliance margin at the other reference point(s) but no more
than 3 EPNdB may be traded this way. Most high bypass (or
"turbofan") engined Chapter 3 aircraft do not have to use
this
tradeoff because of their substantial compliance margins against
the standard.
Table 1 expresses the minimum and maximum margins of
compliance of hushkitted aircraft at each of the three reference
points individually, highlights any excesses, and provides the cumulative values contained in the range of recertificated maximum takeoff weights. Table 2 summarizes the margins achieved
by Chapter 3 aircraft of similar weights as the hushkitted types.
It is clear from Table 1 that most hushkitted aircraft only
barely meet Chapter 3 and only if they rely on the "tradeoff'
allowance. Table 2, on the other hand, shows that aircraft
equipped with modern turbofan engines do not need to rely on
the tradeoff allowance to satisfy the standard, and even frequently show large margins.
The 2000 product line, presented by manufacturers at the
ICAO CAEP/3 in December 1995, indicated average margins at
very high aircraft weights of some 5EPNdB at the three reference points. The margins for the lightest certificated weights
were almost 10EPNdB, which leads to a halving of noise per15 For a discussion of the three noise measurement points and the certification process, see Rolf, supra note 65, at 393-99. Note that the Lateral Noise Measurement Point is also known as the Sideline Noise Measurement Point and the
Flyover Noise Measurement Point as the Takeoff Noise Measurement Point.
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Table 1. Noise Margins (EPNdB) of Recertificated Aircraft
against Chapter 3
Aircraft and
Engine Type
B727-100
JT8D-15
B727-200
JT8D-7/9
B727-200
JT8D-15
B727-200RE
JT8D-15/217C
B737-200/A
JT8D-9/15
B-737-200
JT8D-15/A
B737-200Adv
JT8D-15/A
DC9-10/30
JT8D-7/A/B/-9
DC8-62
JT3D-3B/7

Hushkit

Takeoff
Weight Range
Tonnes

Fedex

72.5

-

76.8

Fedex

76.8

-

80.5

Fedex

70.1 - 87.7

Valsan

86.4

-

92.1

AvAero

53.3

-

53.8

Nordam

47.0

-

54.2

Nordam

44.5

-

57.7

ABS

41.1 - 46.7

BAC

152.0 - 160.1

Mi/Max Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Lateral
Flyover Approach
Cumulative*
-0.4
0.4
-0.9
0.5
-2.0
-1.8
-2.0
0.0
1.8
-0.1
-1.2
-1.4
-1.8
1.3
-1.8
1.6
-1.8
-1.6

0.3
1.9
-1.9
0.6
-1.3
-0.4
1.2
3.9
-2.0
-1.2
2.8
5.4
-2.0
4.4
-1.4
0.9
0.1
2.0

1.8
2.7
0.4
1.7
2.7
3.3
2.0
2.4
3.1
3.2
-0.1
0.4
0.5
3.1
2.9
3.5
0.1
2.9

2.2
4.6
0.1
1.4
0.0
1.0
1.9
4.2
0.2
1.1
0.0
3.9
0.0
3.9
0.0
2.7
0.3
1.7

* The cumulative values are the minimum and maximum margins of one of the recertificated
weights in the total range and do not necessarily correspond to the sum of individual minimum
and maximum values shown separately above for the three Reference conditions (Lateral,
Flyover and Approach).
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 16-17.

ceived by the human being. Compared with the best margins
achieved by hushkitted aircraft, the differences are striking.
Despite the fact that the three reference points are based on
the main areas of noise impact around airports, it should be
remembered that Annex 16 is a basic standard, reflecting
neither the relative annoyance caused by different types of aircraft nor the different operating procedures used by the
airlines.
One significant difference between the certification procedure and the noise intrusion around airports is that Annex 16
allows the amount of noise from individual aircraft to increase
with higher weight whereas human annoyance increases with a
higher noise level, not aircraft size. For example, Chapter 3 allows the noise on Flyover to increase by some 17EPNdB from
the lowest to the highest aircraft weight. This means almost a
four-fold increase in relative loudness or annoyance. Combined
with the 9EPNdB increase allowed at the lateral point, which
defines the "width" of the takeoff noise contour, this equals a
four-fold increase in noise footprint area.
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Table 2. Maximum and Minimum Noise Margins (EPNdB) of
Chapter 3 Types encompassing Weight Range of
Recertificated Types
Aircraft and

Max. Takeoff

Engine Type

Weight Range
Tonnes

Lateral

Mi/Max Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Flyover Approach
Cumulative*
Min/Max

BAe146
ALF500
F100
Tay
MD80/83/87
JT8D-200
MD90
V2500
B737-3/4/500
CFM56
A319/20/21
CFM56
B737-6/7/800
CFM56
B757-200
RB211-535E4
B767-200/ER
CF6-80C

37.3-46.0
47.1-49.9
56.7-74.4
65.9-75.4
60.2-76.8
58.0-78.0
52.6-79.0
99.8-115.9
127.0-181.4

4.2
7.7
4.1
6.2
-0.9
2.0
5.9
7.3
3.4
7.1
1.7
4.1
1.7
6.7
3.5
5.4
3.8
6.3

6.6
10.9
2.7
3.7
-1.0
5.9
9.0
10.1
1.8
4.9
1.7
5.9
4.1
9.1
7.3
11.9
3.3
11.3

0.3
3.2
5.4
6.6
6.7
7.3
8.7
8.3
-0.2
0.0
4.4
6.2
3.6
4.8
6.5
6.8
6.7
7.4

Avge
15.6

20.2
13.4
14.3
6.5
11.9
23.6
25.7
2.2
9.7
8.8
17.3
10.8
18.7
12.2
22.1
17.9
21.9

13.9
9.2
24.6
6.0
13.0
14.7
17.1
19.9

* The cumulative values are the minimum and maximum margins of one of the recertificated
weights in the total range and do not necessarily correspond to the sum of individual minimum
and maximum values shown separately above for the three Reference conditions (Lateral,
Flyover and Approach).
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 17-18.

The departure noise usually has been the major source of
complaints around airports. In the certification context, departure noise is reflected by the combination of the Lateral and
Flyover conditions, which define the length and width of the
noise footprint. Table 3 ranks hushkitted and Chapter 3 aircraft
of the same broad weight range according to their compliance
margins. According to this table, there is a clear dividing line
between the "worst" Chapter 3 aircraft fitted with high bypass
engines and the "best" of the hushkitted types at Lateral and
Flyover. More than half the hushkitted aircraft exceed the cumulative Lateral and Flyover limits and even the "best" hushkitted type only achieve a 2.5 dB cumulative margin. The MD80,
however, with its low bypass engines, falls amongst the hushkitted types.
In addition, the conditions of everyday operations are very different from the conditions during the certification process. Indeed, most daily operations are at less than maximum
certificated takeoff weight and utilize reduced takeoff thrust

HUSHKIT PROBLEM

2000]

355

Table 3. Chapter 3 Departure Noise Margins (EPNdB) All Types

Aircraft Type

Takeoff
Weight Range
Tonnes
77
58 -

MD90
BAe146
B767-200/ER
B757-200
DC8-71/2/3
B737-6/7/8
B737-3/4/5
F100
B727-Tay
A319/20/21

66
37
159
100
149
53
60
47

B737-200
MD80/83/87
B727-200RE
B727-100
B737-200Adv

47
64
86
72
44

-

54
74
92
76
57

152
77
41
53
70

-

160
81
46
53
87

DC8-62
B727-200
DC9-10/30
B737-200/A
B727-200

75
46
181
116
161
79
76
49
78

Hushkit

Cumulative Chapter 3
(Lateral + Flyover)
Departure Compliance Margin
Min-Max
Average
- 16.3
- 17.6
- 15.1
- 13.8
- 12.5
- 13.1
- 12.4
- 9.9
7.2
4.4 - 10.0

None
None
None
None
Reengined
None
None
None
Reengined
None

15.8
10.8
10.8
11.2
12.1
7.7
7.3
7.8

16.0
14.2
12.9
12.5
12.3
10.4
9.8
8.8
7.2
7.2

Nordam
None
Valsan
Fedex
Nordam
BAC/
MGM
Fedex
ABS
AvAero
Fedex

1.0
-0.2
-0.8
-0.1
-3.8

-

4.0
5.2
3.9
2.3
5.7

2.5
2.5
1.6
1.1
1.0

-1.7
-2.8
-3.2
-3.0
-3.3

-

0.4
1.1
-0.7
-2.1
-2.2

-0.6
-0.8
-1.9
-2.5
-2.7

Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 18-19.

(the so-called "de-rating") during initial climb to 1000 to 1500ft.
This generates less noise than in certification compliance-demonstration. Recertificated aircraft already have to limit maximum takeoff weight in the certification process to achieve
Chapter 3 compliance and accordingly cannot take full benefit
from this de-rating in operation.
After the initial climb phase, power "cutback" is normally initiated to normal climb power rating to conserve engine life. To
demonstrate minimum noise possible on flyover, a very high degree of cutback is permitted. Because the jet noise of low bypass
hushkitted aircraft is so much louder, the value of cutback is
considerably more than with a turbofan. Since this cutback is
rarely used in everyday operations, recertificated aircraft lose
the large noise benefit available from this procedure. In the
context of noise impact on the community, the realities of operational practices widen the gap between Chapter 3 and recertificated types even further.
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The Legitimacy of a Bypass Ratio of Three

Modern high turbofans incorporate the results of 30 years of
noise research. Some of these newly discovered technologies
can be applied to older engine types, particularly to sources generated within the engine. But the need for a low jet exhaust
velocity makes a significant lowering of the overall noise of low
bypass jets almost impossible.
Engines with a BPR of 0 to 1 could not satisfy the original
Chapter 2 standards (without hushkitting), nor could those with
a BPR below 2 satisfy the Chapter 3 standard.116 The latter included the Boeing 727s, the early Boeing 737s, the DC9s, the
F28, and the BAC1-1 1. Airplanes that satisfy Chapter 3 from the
outset have BPRs ranging from 4 to 6, while the latest engines
are closer to 10. At full power, this means that the jet noise
improvement over earlier types of engines has been around 15
to 20 dB, even with increased engine size.
According to the study, the point on the bypass ratio where
noticeable improvements become apparent is a minimum of two
and probably closer to three. In order to decide whether the
dividing line between "quiet" and noisy" aircraft lies at a BPR of
2 or 3, aircraft with the JT8D-200 series are compared with aircraft equipped with a Rolls Royce Tay engine. The only two
commercial aircraft originally installed with these engines are
the MD80 series developed from the DC9 and the F100 developed from the F28. It should be remembered that the MD80 is
considerably heavier than the F100 and permitted to make more
noise under Chapter 3.
Table 4. Noise margins (EPNdB) of F100 against MD80 series
Aircraft

F100
MD80
MD83
MD87

Maximum
Takeoff Weight
Tonnes

Lateral
(L)

49.9
74.4
73.5
67.8

4.1
0.7
-0.3
-0.6

Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Flyover
Approach
Cumulative
(F)
(A)
L+F+A
L +F
3.7
-1.0
0.1
2.5

5.6
6.8
6.8
6.9

13.4
6.5
6.5
8.8

7.8
-0.3
-0.2
1.9

Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 12.

When looking at the key combined departure noise indicators
of Lateral and Flyover, the differences are striking. To comply
116

I.C.1.

For a discussion of the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 standard, see supra, Part
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with Chapter 3, the MD80 series rely on a margin at Approach
to offset excesses at one of the two critical departure conditions.
On departure, the MD80 and the MD83 exceed the cumulative
limits. The lighter MD87 has less than a two-decibel margin
while the F100 has almost eight.
This comparison and the examination of the noise data for
Chapter 3 in Tables 2 and 3 (see above), where the "departure"
cumulative margins are between 8 and 16EPNdB, lead to the
conclusion that the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable from the community standpoint is nearer the 8dB margin of the F100 than the near-zero margin of the MD80 series.
This in turn puts the dividing line closer to BPR of 3 than 2.
This conclusion is also supported when examining the only
two complete reengining projects that resulted from noise constraints. The first reengining project replaced the JT3D engines
in the DC8-70 series with CFM56s. The second was the Alenia
reengining of the UPS B727-100 with Tay engines. Their performance against the Chapter 3 standard is summarized below.
Table 5. Noise margins (EPNdB) for DC8-70 series and B727100UPS, reengined with turbofans
Aircraft

DC8-71
DC8-72
DC8-73
B727-100 UPS

Maximum
Takeoff Weight
Tonnes

Lateral
(L)

149
159
161
77

6.5
6.8
6.8
4.6

Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Flyover
Approach
Cumulative
(F)
(A)
L+F+A
L+F
6.0
5.7
5.3
2.6

4.3
4.9
4.8
5.4

16.8
17.4
16.9
12.6

12.5
12.5
12.1
7.2

Source: supra note 43, at 13.

The improved noise performance of aircraft reengined with
the above-mentioned turbofans is clear, especially when compared with the hushkitted aircraft listed in Table 1. In addition,
Table 3 provides an across-the-board comparison of all the relevant aircraft, in particular Chapter 3 aircraft, partially and fully
reengined aircraft and hushkitted aircraft. The dashed line indicates the boundary between aircraft with engines of less than
BPR of 2 and greater than 3.
c.

Fuel Consumption and Exhaust Emissions

Although hushkits incorporating new engines or improved
performance features may well improve fuel consumption, the
real comparison should be made with modern aircraft that
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would have replaced the Chapter 2 aircraft had they been retired by 2000 in the U.S. and by April 1, 2002, in the EU. Accordingly, arguments claiming that retaining or marginally
improving fuel consumption of older aircraft ignore the fact
that each newly developed aircraft design is fundamentally better than its predecessor.
The same rationale extends into the issue of engine exhaust
emissions. The most important products of combustion that
have an impact on the environment are oxides of nitrogen
(NOx) and carbon dioxide (C0 2), while others receiving attention are carbon monoxide (CO), water (H 20), unburned hydro-

carbons (UHC), and visible carbon particles (smoke).
With respect to the emission of NOx, modern engines of the
same size category as those used on hushkitted aircraft are much
more advanced in NOx control than the earlier designs. For
example, the JT8D-200 series, used as a replacement for earlier
JT8D engines in some of the recertificated aircraft, produces
50% or more NOx than engines like the CFM56 in Boeing and
Airbus aircraft and the BR700 series destined for the latest
DC9/MD80 variant, the B717. These modern engines comply
with the latest Annex 16 proposals of CAEP/4 whereas the older
types only satisfy the 1985 standards. With regard to other engine exhaust emissions, the situation is similar.
These results again have been confirmed by an article published in the ICAO Journal of July/August 1998. According to
this article, modern aircraft have significantly lower emissions
than older aircraft. Emissions from such modern aircraft can
contain up to 50 percent less carbon dioxide, 70 percent less
carbon monoxide, and 90 percent fewer unburned hydrocarbons. 117 The article supports this conclusion with data provided
by Lufthansa, which compares the level of emissions by aircraft
type and engines.
d.

Conclusion

The above-mentioned results clearly show that the full benefits resulting from the progressive phase-out of Chapter 2 aircraft over the past two decades will be jeopardized by any
extension of the operational lives of low bypass aircraft via
hushkitting and recertification.
117 SeeJane Hupe, CAEP/4 May Be a Turning Point in ICAO's Work in Environmental Protection, 53 ICAO JouRNAL, July/Aug. 1998, at 7.
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2. A Review of the Raisbeck Modification"'
Airports Council International North America ("ACI-North
America") conducted a study on the Raisbeck Engineering
Stage 3 modification kit for Boeing 727-200 aircraft equipped
with the JT8D-15 engine. The study compares the noise improvements of the Raisbeck modification with an original Chapter 2 Boeing 727 and with a Fedex Hushkit 727. It references
little to the original Stage 3 certificated Boeing 757.
The Raisbeck modification achieves a 12% thrust reduction
from the takeoff thrust level of the JT8D-1 5 engine by reducing
the gross weight and modifying the flap settings. On a Boeing
727-200 with JT8D-15 engines, a 12% thrust decrease equals a
reduction of about 1600 pounds of takeoff thrust, which in turn
correlates to a noise reduction of about 3 to 4 dB." 9 "By using
the approach noise trade-off allowed under FAR Part 36, these
120
modifications allow the aircraft ...to meet the Stage 3 limits.
FAR Part 36 certification limits aircraft takeoff, landing, and
sideline noise at three specific monitoring locations-one for
each measurement. For takeoff, this point is 3.5 nautical miles
from break release.
One study compares the Raisbeck modified aircraft to the
standard Boeing 727-200 with JT8D-15 engines at a comparable
1
takeoff weight.

21

Although the Raisbeck aircraft is somewhat quieter than the
unmodified Boeing 727 on the runway sideline and on takeoff,
the noise improvement is only noticed close to the runway. At
greater distances, the Raisbeck aircraft is similar to the unmodified aircraft. Although the 727-200 equipped with the FedEx
hushkit is distinctively quieter on takeoff, it still does not compare with the noise footprint of the Boeing 757.122

The study concludes that, although the Raisbeck Stage 3 kit is
a cost-effective solution to achieve Stage 3 compliance under
FAR 36, the real benefits to the Community remain limited.
The Raisbeck modification does not provide significant noise reductions beyond the extent of the measurement points specified
118 This chapter is based on a study by ACI-North America, in which the
benefits of the Raisbeck modification were examined. See, ACI-North America, A
Review of the Community Noise Impact of the Raisbeck Boeing 727-200 (IGW)
Stage 3 Kit,
Mar. 15, 1999.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 See infra Annex A.
122 See id.
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in FAR Part 36, and probably only has a discernable effect on
communities within one mile of the end of the runway protection zone.' 23
III.
A.

NOISE POLLUTION AROUND EU AND
U.S. AIRPORTS

THE CASES OF SALZBURG AIRPORT AND AMSTERDAM
AIRPORT SCHIPHOL

The future growth of civil aviation in Europe depends upon
the ability of the aviation industry to reduce the current aircraft
noise levels. The provision of sufficient capacity at European
airports is of equal importance to U.S. as to European carriers.
Hushkitted Chapter 2 aircraft have a significantly worse noise
performance than the new improved aircraft certificated to
Chapter 3 standards. According to ACI-Europe, 124 a 12% increase in the number of hushkitted aircraft equals a 50% increase in noise contour therefore disproportionately increasing
the cumulative noise load around airports. The case of Salzburg
Airport and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol clearly illustrate this.
1.

Salzburg Airport

Salzburg Airport, a typical regional European airport, allowed
only aircraft meeting Chapter 3 as early as 1991. The City of
Salzburg's Environmental Department conducted a study based
on noise data from the airport's monitoring system.1 2 5 This
study showed that between 1988 and 1995 the noise level
around the airport decreased from 66dB to 59dB despite an increase in aircraft movements from 11,002 to 23,563.126 Despite a
114% increase in air movements since 1988, annual noise levels
have decreased by 80%.127
Another study conducted at the airport revealed that 356
takeoffs of hushkitted aircraft (one daily departure) produced
the same noise levels as the current 25,000 commercial move123 See id.
124 ACI Europe represents the interests of over 210 airport operators with
some 450 airports in 48 countries stretching from Portugal to the far east of Russia accounting for over 90% of commercial air traffic in Europe. See members
link at <http://www.aci-europe.org>.
125 See ACI Europe, Airports Support Ban on Hush-Kitted Aircraft, (visited Jan. 29,
2000) <http:www.aci-europe.org/Public/Pressoffice/html/Releases/0060.htm>.
126 See id.
127 See id.
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ments. That means that one hushkit equals sixty-eight normal
128
Chapter 3 movements.
The Salzburg's Environmental Department also compared aircraft types by the noise energy they emit, based on the airport's
noise monitoring system. Taking the noisiest Chapter 3 aircraft
operating in Salzburg (the MD80), two Airbus A310s, five Boeing 757s, ten Fokker 100s, forty Dash 8s, or fifty Canadian Regional Jets can take off instead of one MD80.129 This means that
Salzburg Airport could triple its movements with low-noise aircraft without increasing the noise impact.130 Hushkitted aircraft
generate noise levels for exceeding noise levels of Chapter 3 aircraft. One hushkitted Boeing 727 creates the same noise energy
as three Boeing 767s or eight A320s or twenty Fokker 70s or
forty Canadian Regional Jets. l3 ' In addition, the hushkitted aircraft's sound characteristics and its weak climb performance
cause complaints from areas of up to 10 km, where the airport
normally receives no negative reactions. 132 The fact that
hushkitted aircraft fly about 1000 feet lower on their departure
route than normal Chapter 3 aircraft forms one of the reasons
1 33
for these complaints.
3
2. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
In the Netherlands, the level of noise caused by aircraft is
measured in Kosten units (Ke) . 13 These can be plotted on a
map and joined up to produce noise contours showing areas
that receive the same amount of noise. The effective capacity of
Amsterdam's Airport Schiphol ("Schiphol") is restricted by two
legal noise zones, which cannot be exceeded at any point or in
any year.'3 6 The most restrictive in the sense of annual capacity
is the present 35 Ke noise zone that restricts the overall noise
impact by flying aircraft during a twelve-month period. Because
noise nuisance is confined to the area within the 35 Ke contour,
an indemnity zone is established outside the 35 Ke contour,
128
129

See id.
See id.

130 See id.
131 See id.
132

See id.

133 See id.
134 See Eric de Boer, Relative Noise Capacity Consumption of Hushkitted Aircraft at
Schiphol Airport, Oct. 3, 1999.
135 Kosten Noise Capacity: named after Dutch Professor Kosten who developed
formulas to calculate aircraft noise.
136 See de Boer, supra note 134.
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bounded by the 30 Ke contour (roughly comparable with LAeq
134=55 dB). Within this area, the construction of new housing
is prohibited. 137 Because this noise limitation system is very hard
to comply with in practice, it inhibits all further growth in the
number of aircraft movements, unless it is compensated by a reduction in average noise level per aircraft movement.
To comply with these noise limitations, Schiphol actively encouraged carriers to replace the noisiest Chapter 2 aircraft with
quieter aircraft. In March 1999, Chapter 2 flights only accounted for less than 1% of all commercial flights. To accommodate further air traffic growth, however, Schiphol continues
to discourage the use of noisy aircraft and tries to stimulate the
use of modern Chapter 3 aircraft. The proliferation of hushkitted aircraft would undermine this policy because it would effectively reduce Schiphol's annual capacity. In order to prove their
claim, Schiphol airport calculated the "noise capacity exchange
rate" between some hushkitted ex-Chapter 2 aircraft and some
equivalent modern first-time certificated Chapter 3 aircraft.
Table 6. Noise capacity exchange rate for Recertificated
aircraft against Chapter 3 aircraft
Hushkitted type

DC9-30

B727-200

0.2

0.97

Equivalent modern quiet type

F100

A321

Average cumulative margin over 3
measurement points (EPNdB)

13.9

13.3

9.45

2.0

1.9

1.5

2.9

2.6

1.8

Average cumulative margin over 3
measurement points (EPNdB)

B737-200
1.62
B737-500

Exchange ratio - in Kosten noise

rating
Exchange ratio - in LAeq rating

system
Source: de Boer, supra note 134.

These tables mean that, in terms of "Kosten noise capacity,"
each flight with a hushkitted DC9-30 uses up as much available
noise capacity as two flights with a comparable Chapter 3 air-

137

See id.
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craft like the F100. In terms of "LAeq noise capacity" the
equivalent is nearly three (2.9) F100 flights.
The comparison was made with equivalent aircraft types that
are now in widespread use and that are not even the quietest in
their class at the moment. The exchange ratios with the most
modem "state of the art" aircraft types would even be higher.
B.

NOISE PROBLEMS AT

U.S.

AIRPORTS

United States airports have recognized the urgent need for a
complete phase-out of Chapter 2 aircraft, including hushkitted
or otherwise recertificated types. David Z. Plavin, President of
ACI-North America, 138 shares the EU's conviction that acoustically modified aircraft do not produce the large reductions in
community noise levels as was expected and likely will anger residents living near airports once they realize that an all Stage 3
fleet will only marginally reduce the noise levels in their communities. Moreover, the community noise impacts probably will
worsen as a result of the expected growth in air travel. 139 Therefore, he strongly
supports developing a Stage 4 standard within
40
CAEP/5.1

In addition, some U.S. airlines recognize the need to update
their fleet with newer and less noisy aircraft. US Airways is expected to replace old Boeing 727s and McDonnell Douglas DC9s with new Airbus A320s on its East Coast shuttle routes. According to US Airways, the new planes spread their noise over
an area 10 times smaller than their old planes at airports in Boston and Washington.'4 1 And around New York's La Guardia,
the noise "footprint" is seventeen times smaller. 4 2 According to
Congressman Joe Crowley, who represents residents living near
138Airports Council International-North America, which spans the United
States and Canada, consists of almost 150 governing bodies owning and operating airports as well as 325 business providing services and products on which
airports rely.
139 According to Airport Traffic Figures of the Airports Council International,
passenger traffic rose four percent, cargo traffic eight percent, and aircraft movements three percent between August 1998 and August 1999. Overall air transport figures for the first eight months of 1999 reflect continued, steady growth.
See ACI, Airport Traffic Figures Reflect Steady Growth, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http:/
/www.airports.org/media/mr_19991217.html>.
140 See Hearingon European Union Ban on Aircraft 'Hush-Kits' Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 1999 (Statement of
David Z. Plavin, President of ACI-NA) WL 20011240 (1999).
141 See Planes Getting Quieter; Noise Standard in Effect Jan. 1, CINCINNATI POST,
Dec. 21, 1999, at 7A.
142 See

id.
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La Guardia, the hush kits meet "the letter of the law in compliance, but it's not in the spirit of the law, which is to have these
airplanes become more quiet. "143
Residents around U.S. airports increasingly complain about
aircraft noise affecting their residential neighborhoods. Examples of constant oppositions by residents against airport expansion plans can be found throughout the United States, in
particular in St. Charles, 14 4 Miami, 145 New York, and San
Francisco 46 .
Moreover, the City of Burbank reached an agreement with
the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority whereby the
Airport Authority is allowed to expand the airport in exchange
for a night closure of the building and the fulfillment of some
other conditions.' 47 The parties agreed to a "framework settlement" that, among other things, allows the airport to adopt
noise standards that go beyond national minimum standards, including an eventual ban on aircraft that meet the Stage 3 noise
requirements via hushkits or re-engining.1 48 Los Angeles International (LAX) and Ontario International (ONT) airports also
seem to recognize that Stage 2 aircraft have older engines
that
49
generate more noise and emit more air pollution.1

Id.
St. Charles Citizens Against Aircraft Noise oppose the city of St. Louis' plans
to expand the airport by adding a runway which will bring the airport closer to St.
Charles and aircraft lower over the city's historic districts, homes, churches, and
schools. They even initiated various lawsuits in state and federal courts. SeeJohn
Sonderegger & Ralph Dummit, St. Charles County Briefs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 1.
145 See Tyler Bridges, Aircraft Noise Still A Problem: Neighbors Complain, But No
Plans Approved, MIAMi HERALD, Apr. 11, 1999, at 1.
146 Angelica Pence, More Houses Near SFO to Get Noise Insulation/Additional$34
Million Approved for Upgrades, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Feb. 25, 2000.
147 See Kristin S. Krause, Harder than It Sounds, TRAFFIc WORLD, Aug. 9, 1999, at
34; James Baumgarner, U.S. To Charge EC Over Noise Regulation, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 10, 1999, at 1.
148 See Burbank Strikes Accord With Airport For New Terminal, WKLY. OF Bus. AVIA143

144

TION,

Aug. 16, 1999, at 76.

See Ban on Noisy Stage 2 Aircraft Goes Into Effect Jan. 1 at LAX and Ontario
Airports, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 30, 1999.
149
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IV. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU REGULATION WITH
THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO

TRADE AND WITH THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TRADE
IN SERVICES

A.

AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE

(TBT

AGREEMENT)

150

Among various agreements attached to the Agreement Creating the World Trade Organization ("WTO Charter"), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") exerts
some legal discipline over domestic standards effecting interna51
tional trade.1
1.

Article 2.1

Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement contains a Most-FavoredNation and a National Treatment obligation. The Article specifically provides that: "Members shall ensure that in respect of
technical regulations, products imported from the territory of
any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to
52
like products originating in any other country."'
This Article prohibits discrimination between like products
on the basis of origin. For the purpose of this Article, aircraft
registered in the EU and aircraft registered in third countries
are undoubtedly "like" products.
The issue to be examined, accordingly, is whether the Regulation treats aircraft registered in a third country "less favorably"
than similar EU registered aircraft. In that respect, it is useful to

review the measures introduced by the Regulation. 5
150 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/IA II-AIA
to (Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994) [hereinafter "TBT
Agreement"].
151See Seung Wha Chang, GATTing a Green Trade Barrier-Eco-labelingand the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriersto Trade, 31J. WORLD TRADE 137, 139 (1997).
152 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.1, supra note 150.
153 The Regulation subjects aircraft registered in an EU Member State to the
non-addition rule. This rule prohibits Member States from adding recertificated
aircraft to their registers as of May 4, 2000. See Regulation, Art. 3.1, supra note 11,
at 49. Nevertheless, an aircraft registered in any Member State before May 4,
2000, which has been registered in the Community ever since, will not be affected
by the non-addition rule. See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49. Additionally, the Regulation introduces a non-operation rule, aimed both at EU and third
country carriers. The non-operation rule prohibits recertificated aircraft from
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The United States opposes the measure because it allows EU
aircraft to be transferred from the register of one Member State
to another after May 4, 2000, without losing its right to operate
after 2002.154 Unlike aircraft registered in the EU, a third country aircraft that is transferred to the registry of another country
after May 4, 2000, is barred from operating in the Community
after 2002.'
Although this difference in treatment might initially seem discriminatory, it is not discriminatory considering
the EU as a single aviation market. Even if national registers are
maintained for practical and historical purposes, these different
registers constitute de facto one Community register. Accordingly, transfers among national registers within the EU should
not be regarded as transfers affecting the operating rights of the
aircraft concerned.
In conclusion, this measure does not discriminate between
aircraft registered in the Community and aircraft registered in
third countries. Both types of registered aircraft receive equal
treatment. The measure allows all aircraft, regardless of origin,
to continue to operate after 2002 in the EU provided that they
were operating into the EU before 2000 and that they have re15 6
mained on the same register.

The nature of a technical standard, such as the one the EU
Regulation enacted, is that like all non-tariff barriers "their effects are neither immediately visible NOR MEASURABLE.

'157

Although the EU did not propose or adopt the Regulation with
the specific purpose of discriminating and/or creating an obstacle to trade, distortions of trade might nonetheless result from
the fact that national standards and technical regulations are
different.

158

operating in the territory of the Community as of April 1, 2002, unless they meet
two conditions. These conditions require an airplane operator to prove (1) that
the plane was on the register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and (2) that it
operated in the Community between April 1, 1995, and May 4, 2000. See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49. To put EU aircraft at the same level as third
country aircraft, Article 3.4 imposes the same non-operation obligation on EU
aircraft.
154See H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999).
1-5 See Statement of Council's Reasons, 1998 O.J. (C 404) 5, 5.
156 See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
157 Nusbaumer, supra note 101, at 545 (emphasis added).
158 SeeJ.H.J. Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriersand on
Government Procurement in Internationaland EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 5, 7 (1982).
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Therefore, the question remains, under the ambit of Article
2.2 of the TBT Agreement, whether this facially neutral measure
creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade or constitutes a case of
disguised discrimination.
2.

Article 2.2

Article 2.2, a core provision of the TBT Agreement, states
that:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of
the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives
are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available
scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end uses of products.1 59
To be compatible with the TBT Agreement and GATT, a technical regulation should not create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.
The United States claims that the Regulation creates an obstacle to trade because it harms the U.S. aviation industry. The
United States, however, has failed so far to provide sufficient evidence that demonstrates the claimed two billion dollar economic impact of the measure. Most hushkitted aircraft, such as
Boeing 727s and DC9s, do not operate transatlantic routes.16 If
they do, these carriers are on the U.S. register before May 4,
2000, and are operating in the Community before that same
date. Therefore, the measure will not affect them. The EU
measure solely prevents the United States from adding more
hushkitted aircraft on these routes.
In addition, the Regulation has only a limited impact on the
resale market of older aircraft because these aircraft in any
event at or close to the end of their economic life. The Regulation does not prevent U.S. carriers from reselling these aircraft
to third countries. The measure merely prevents these third
159 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.2, supra note 150.
16 See Alan Yonan, Jr. U.S. to File Complaint Over EU's Airplane "Hush Kit" Ban,

DowJONES NEws SERV., Jan. 13, 2000.
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countries from operating these older aircraft in the European
Community. Since more than 85% of the U.S. fleet are short to
medium haul aircraft, the majority of U.S. aircraft are not technically eligible to operate between places such as Southern Af16
rica and Europe.

1

In addition, the United States still needs to either establish
protectionist intent or prove that the measure exceeds what is
"necessary."
a.

Protectionist Intent or Effect

To determine whether the Regulation has a protectionist intent or effect, the definition of the targeted aircraft needs to be
examined.
"Recertificated aircraft" includes hushkitted aircraft and aircraft that have undergone operational restrictions (weight restrictions or reduced flap setting) to meet the Chapter 3
standard. It excludes reengined aircraft, except when the replacement engine has a bypass ratio lower than three.
The United States claims that the measure will detrimentally
affect U.S. carriers because more U.S. carriers have aircraft that
fall within the recertificated category than EU carriers. More
U.S. carriers have invested in hushkit technology than their EU
counterparts. In addition, U.S. engine manufacturers produce
most engines installed in older aircraft having a bypass ratio of
less than three.
The European Union, on the other hand, asserts that there is
no protectionist intent behind the adoption of the measure.
The EU's sole motivations are environmental and human health
concerns. 6 2 The EU maintains that the methodology used to
distinguish between aircraft covered by the Regulation is based
on sound technical data, collected on the basis of an independent study. These data concerning the noise certification clearly
demonstrate that the noise level of hushkitted aircraft or aircraft
with low bypass ratio engines is, weight for weight, considerably
more damaging to the environment than aircraft originally certificated to conform with Chapter 3.
161 See websites of several U.S. carriers (such as <http://www.aa.com/>, <http:/
/www.delta-air.com>, <http://www.ual.com>, <http://www.usair.com>) and aircraft manufacturers (such as <http://www.boeing.com/commercial> and <http:/
/www.airbus.com>).
162

See Information Pack, supra note 71, at 5.
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Moreover, the United States doubts the usefulness of a bypass
ratio of three to distinguish between aircraft targeted by the
Regulation. It alleges that the EU chose a bypass ratio of three
only or primarily to exclude U.S. manufactured engines from
the permitted reengining process. The United States claims
that the European producers manufacture most high bypass engines, which may be used to reengine older aircraft. To answer
these allegations, the EU uses scientific evidence to prove the
usefulness of a bypass ratio of three in deciding which aircraft
should be prevented from being registered and operated in the
European Community.163
The bypass ratio of three is based on real performance only
and focuses on aircraft having proportionally a significant detrimental effect on the noise level at EU airports. In addition, Federal Aviation Regulation FAR 36, as amended by Amendment 7
of 1977, also recognized the usefulness of a bypass ratio of
164
three.
The technical experts with the United States, however, contest
the validity of the EU's evidence. First, they assert that the
hushkitted aircraft are situated around the ICAO Chapter 3
noise limit because U.S. carriers decided to hushkit their older
aircraft only to the extent necessary to conform to the Chapter 3
noise standards. Secondly, the findings that U.S. experts used in
Annex B165 suggest that many aircraft with a high bypass ratio
suffer from a worse noise performance than some aircraft with
lower bypass ratios.
These results are only superficially contradictory. The airplanes that the U.S. report used are all aircraft with a bypass
ratio of more than three. The United States fails to mention
that these aircraft still have a significantly better noise performance than hushkitted aircraft even if some of them do not have
the best noise performance. Additionally, the issue here is not
to determine the noisiness of these high bypass ratio aircraft but
to see whether the criteria of a bypass ratio of 3 is justified. According to the data provided in Table 3, which is not contradictory to the data provided by the United States in Annex B, the
use of a bypass ratio of three to distinguish aircraft seems fully
justified. Therefore, one may reasonably conclude that the defiSee supra Part II. B.l.b.
See 14 C.F.R. § 36.7, amended by 42 FR 12371, Mar. 3, 1977.
165 See infra, Annex B.
163

164
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nition of recertificated aircraft is based on sound scientific and
technical data and has no protectionist intent or effect.
b.

Measure Should not Create an "Unnecessary" Obstacle to
Trade and Should Not Be More Trade-Restrictive
than Necessary to Fulfill a Legitimate Objective

As discussed above, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement includes the protection of the environment as a legitimate objective. Because excessive aircraft noise is recognized as a severe
environmental problem, the avoidance of such further noise
pollution should be considered as a legitimate environmental
concern. The second issue then is whether the measure is more
trade-restrictive than is necessary to fulfill the legitimate concern of environmental protection or, in other words, whether
the EU could have adopted an alternative measure with less impact upon international air transport.
The European Union's Regulation merely avoids future noise
level increases at Community airports. Indeed, recertificated
aircraft operating in the European Community before May 4,
2000, will still be allowed to serve the same Community airports
after April 1, 2002. The measure merely prevents EU Member
States from adding additional recertificated aircraft to its registers. Likewise, recertificated aircraft registered in third countries after May 4, 2000, will be denied access to the territory of
the Community.166
By freezing the existing noise levels, the EU has chosen the
least trade-restrictive measure in order to prevent further noise
pollution and to enhance the protection of a legitimate environmental concern.
c.

Risks
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement mandates that WTO members to take into account the risks of the non-fulfillment of a
legitimate objective, including the protection of human health
and of the environment. 167 It also enumerates the factors to assess these risks, including available scientific and technical information, related processing technology, and intended end-uses
of products.
The EU's reluctance to implement the measure could clearly
entail serious risks not only to human health and the environ166
167

See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at. 49.
See TBT Agreement, Art. 2.2, supra note 150.
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ment, but also to the European aviation market as a single economic entity.

Noise from aircraft causes mental distress and affects human's
tolerance levels.' 6s As air traffic becomes denser and airport
congestion steadily increases, the risk that noise disturbance by
aircraft movements will cause more devastating consequences to
human health and the environment is inevitable. In addition, if
the EU failed to take the measure, airports would likely impose
unilateral "curfews,"' 6 9 threatening the integrity of the European single aviation market.
It is arguable that there would be no violation of ICAO standards were individual airports to implement rules that, for example, limited hushkitted aircraft to only day time hours or
assessed fees on hushkitted aircraft much higher, perhaps even
prohibitively higher, than on other aircraft. Were the U.S. to
press its complaint, therefore, a successful outcome for the U.S.
could well amount to a Pyrrhic victory, with the implementation
of outright bans by individual airports throughout the EU. In
addition, the U.S. has many airportslV°-indeed, the entire State
of Hawaiia' 7 -that have adopted noise prohibition on aircraft
that arguably run afoul of ICAO's minimum requirements. Can
the U.S. argue that these individual U.S. airport prohibitions are
legal but comparable prohibitions by European airports not?
d.

Conclusion

The EU Regulation does not create an obstacle to trade for
U.S. carriers. The evidence the U.S. government advanced to
prove the alleged economic impact of more than two billion dollars on the U.S. aviation industry is not at all persuasive. No
facts or data have been produced that would support any damages much less damages of $2 billion. Nor has the United States
See Goh, supra note 63, at 280-81.
See supra Part I.C.2.a. for examples of unilateral action taken by several governments throughout the EU.
170 See supra, Part III.B.
171 In 1990, the U.S. Congress adopted 49 U.S.C. § 47528, prohibiting all U.S.
and foreign airlines from operating more Stage 2 aircraft into Hawaii than they
operated into Hawaii on November 5, 1990. This law was used at least once to
preclude a new foreign carrier from flying into Hawaii using Stage 2 aircraft. In
1996, Orient Avia, a designated carrier from Russia, obtained DOT authority to
operate Vladivostok-Hawaii, but was precluded because of the Congressional
prohibition. See DOT Grants Orient Avia's Bid for Russia-Hawaii service, AVIATION DAILY, May 17, 1996; see also Russia's Orient Avia Still Eyes U.S. Service,
AVIATION DAILY AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 24, 1997.
168
169
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produced any evidence as to the alleged detrimental effect on
U.S. carriers were the Regulation adopted. Moreover, the Regulation's alleged impact on the resale market of aging U.S. aircraft carriers is not certain considering that most of these
aircraft are close to or at the end of their economic life.
Even if the Regulation creates an obstacle to trade, Article 2.2
requires that a measure must have either a protectionist intent
or effect, or that it went beyond what is necessary. Given the
impetus from environmental groups for the adoption of this
Regulation and considering that the Regulation's coverage as
well as the non-addition and non-operation rule are based on
sound technical data, the EU Regulation does not reveal any
protectionist intent or effect. In addition, the EU Regulation
does not introduce a flat ban, but merely freezes the existing
noise level around Community airports, thus opting for the least
trade-restrictive measure.
3. Article 2.4
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO members to
base their regulations as much as possible on international standards. Article 2.4 specifically provides:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members
shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their
technical regulations except when such international standards
or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means
for the fulfillment [sic] of the legitimate objectives pursued, for
instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors
or fundamental technological problems.' 72
a.

The Role and Force of Standards

The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that
ICAO develops in the operational or technical field are only recommendations. It has been argued that SARPs do not bind contracting Parties. In fact, parties can contradict SARPs when
necessary. 173 The incorporation of ICAO standards in Community legislation enhances the effectiveness of these standards. 7 1
TBT Agreement, Art. 2.4, supra note 150.
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN
TION ORGANIZATION, 77-78 (1969).
174 See Goh, supra note 63, at 285.
172

173

THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL

AVIA-
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Moreover, ICAO standards are minimum standards. Contracting parties increasingly find them as insufficient to address
the safety and well-being of other citizens. 75 Article 1.2 of Part
II of Volume I of Annex 16 provides that the State of Registry
shall grant or validate a noise certification if satisfactory evidence is provided that the aircraft complies with requirements
that are at least equal to the standards contained in Annex 16.
Accordingly, this language implicitly but clearly indicates the
"minimal" nature of these standards and seems arguably to allow
Contracting States to adopt more stringent standards.
Even if the United States complies with the minimum standards Annex 16 sets forth, the EU could nonetheless still unilaterally impose stricter standards if the health and well-being of
European citizens required it to do so.
b.

The Compatibility of the Regulation with International
Standards

The EU Regulation is not contrary to the international standards set by the ICAO. The Regulation does not introduce a
new noise standard nor modify the current Chapter 3 standard,
since it is nothing more than an operational rule aimed at
preventing noise pollution increase from recertificated aircraft
at European airports. Chapter 3 does not cover operational
noise limits around airports. On the contrary, it merely sets
forth noise measurement standards for aircraft for which the application for a certificate of airworthiness for the prototype was
accepted on or after October 6, 1977.176 The Regulation limits
operations in the European Community and prevents the addition of recertificated aircraft on European registers. Therefore,
it does not affect the ICAO certification rules or the Chapter 3
standard.
Even if the Regulation is contrary to the existing Chapter 3
standard, the Regulation is nevertheless justified under Article
2.4 of the TBT Agreement. First, the language used in Article
2.4 clearly indicates that the drafters of this provision wanted to
77
avoid a watertight obligation to use international standards.
The provision thus leaves some room for WTO members to
adopt stricter standards.
175

See Mendes de Leon, supra note 83, at 131.

176

See id.

177

See Nusbaumer, supra note 101, at 545.
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Second, because the ICAO adopted the Chapter 3 standard
more than 20 years ago (1977), this standard no longer reflects
recent developments in engine technology or the exponential
increase in air traffic volume. The EU believes the Chapter 3
standard is "ineffective or inappropriate" to avoid further environmental degradation from increasing noise pollution from
aircraft movements. The establishment of a stricter standard in
the Regulation, by freezing the existing noise levels, is justified
under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
As mentioned above, even if hushkits reduce some noise,
hushkitted aircraft remain much noisier than aircraft equipped
with new technology engines. 78 They also emit more pollutants
179
than modern aircraft.

The Regulation does not discriminate against foreign airlines
or manufacturers' 80 since EU airlines are equally prevented
from using hushkitted aircraft and EU manufacturers of noncompliant engines are equally affected. 18 ' The hushkit rule affects not only U.S. aircraft, such as refitted MD-80s, DC-9s, and
Boeing 727s, but
also European aircraft, such as BAG-ilis and
2
8
Fokker F-28s.'

The complaints from residential neighborhoods surrounding
the airports provided the impetus for environmental groups to
encourage 3 the EU to pass the measure, not the EU aviation
industry.

18

See Smith, supra note 43, at 4.
179 See Hupe, supra note 117, at 7.
180See supra Part IV. A.1 & 2.
1s For example, Omega Air, an Irish manufacturer of hushkits and re-engining technology. At the end of December, the English High Court ruled against
the EU's non-addition rule for hushkitted aircraft in favor of Omega Air. The
Court ruled that the use of engine bypass ratios instead of noise footprints to bar
aircraft was invalid. The court referred the case to the European Court ofJustice,
which is expected to rule on the validity of the engine bypass ratio standard.
Omega Air is also contesting the validity of the use of bypass ratios directly before
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities and is claiming damages. In addition, it has begun proceedings against the rule in the Irish High
Court. See English Court Rules Against European Union Ban, AiRPORTS, Jan. 4, 2000.
182 See Christopher Fotos, TransatlanticBattle Looms Over Hushkits; Airports Back
Need For New Controls, AiRPORTS, Sept. 14, 1999, at 380.
183Examples include: protests against the noise levels at London-Stansted Airport and the divided opinions of the local community over the construction of a
second run-way at UK's Manchester airport. See Goh, supra note 63, at 280.
178
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4. Article 2.8
The Regulation should especially be examined in light of Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement which states that: "Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify technical regulations based on
product requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics."184
This Article contains mild language. The words "wherever appropriate" clearly leave some room for members to base their
technical regulations on design characteristics. Accordingly, the
EU does not deem itself to be violating this Article when it acknowledges that the Regulation is indeed based on design
rather than on performance characteristics.
B.

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES

(GATS)

One of the basic provisions in GATS is the most-favored-nation ("MFN") obligation of Article II. Contrary to the corresponding principle in GATT, however, GATS members may
maintain a MFN-inconsistent measure provided they list such
MFN exemptions upon entry into force of the GATS. The GATS
Annex on Air Transport Services constitutes such an Article II
exemption.185
The Annex on Air Transport Services covers all "measures affecting trade in air transport services, scheduled or non-scheduled, and ancillary services" (Section 1 of the Annex). Because
existing obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements
are "grandfathered," 1 6 the Annex does not achieve any significant liberalization of the many bilateral agreements.
Moreover, Section 2 of the Annex explicitly excludes traffic
rights and ancillary services from the scope of the GATS (the socalled "hard rights"). GATS only applies to aircraft repair and
184

TBT Agreement, Art. 2.8, supra note 150.

185

See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Liberalization of InternationalAir Transport ServPERSPECFIVES OF AIR LAW, SPACE LAW, AND INTERNA-

ices Through the GATS?, in

TIONAL BUSINESS LAW FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1996).
186 "Grandfather rights" or the "Existing legislation

clause" is a concept introduced in the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and enabled Contracting Parties to maintain existing legislation inconsistent with Part II (Articles 3 to 23) of GATT. Similarly, Section 1 of
the Annex on Air Transport Services provides: "It is confirmed that any specific
commitment made or obligation assumed under this Agreement shall not reduce
or affect a Member's obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements that
are in effect at the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO." 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994).
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maintenance services, the selling and marketing of air transport
services, and computer reservation systems (the so-called "softrights") 187
Since the EU Regulation does not deal with any of these three
covered "soft ancillary services," GATS is not applicable to the
measure.
V.

COMPATIBILITY WITH THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
AND WITH BILATERAL AIR SERVICES
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN
EU MEMBER STATES AND
THE U.S.
A.

DIRECTIVE VERSUS REGULATION

The Council's decision to change the proposed directive into
a regulation is fully justified. Contrary to the opinion of those
who oppose the Regulation, this change was not made to enable
Members States to escape their international obligations under
the bilateral air services agreements with the United States.
In this regard, it is useful to note the differences between a
regulation and a directive. According to Article 249 (ex Article
189) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a regulation has general application, is binding in its entirety, and is
directly applicable in all Member States. A directive, however, is
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 188
Whether the measure takes the form of a regulation or a directive, in both cases Member States are bound by the substantive obligations of the measure. The difference between these
two Community legislative acts lies herein: to effect the internal
legal order of a Member State, a directive requires a positive act
of implementation, the form of which is left to the individual
Member State's discretion. A regulation, to the contrary, does
not require an act of implementation but, once adopted, directly effects the internal legal order of a Member State.
This difference is exactly why the Council preferred a regulation. Indeed, the pressing noise problem around airports commanded a quick and uniform response. The long
187 Section

188Article

3 of the Annex on Air Transport Services, GATS, supra note 42.
249 (ex Article 189) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Es-

tablishing the European Community, 1997 (C 340) 173.
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implementation process of a Directive would have caused not
delay, but extensive disuniformity during the
only considerable
189
delay period.
B.

COMPATIBILITY WITH CHICAGO CONVENTION

The Regulation should be examined under several Articles of
the Chicago Convention. Article 15 is especially relevant since it
introduces a non-discrimination principle with regard to access
to airports, the use of air navigation facilities, and the charges
related to both. 190 In essence, Article 15 provides that every airport in a contracting State that is open to public use by its national aircraft, should also be open under uniform conditions to
the aircraft of all other contracting Parties. 9 1 Closely related to
Article 15 is Article 44, which provides that the aims and objectives of ICAO are to ensure that the rights of contracting States
State has a fair
are fully respected and that every contracting
192
airlines.
international
operate
to
opportunity
The United States alleges that the Regulation makes these articles obsolete since it restricts the access of U.S. carriers to
Community airports and, accordingly, U.S. carriers would no
longer enjoy a fair opportunity to operate international airlines.
As already mentioned under the TBT Agreement, however,
the Regulation applies equally to EU carriers as well as to U.S.
carriers, regardless of the transfer rule. 93 Although this rule
might seem facially discriminatory, it is nonetheless justified in
light of the single European aviation market. Since different national registers constitute in fact one Community register, transfers between these registers should not affect the operating
rights of Community aircraft. Because the United States allegedly only operates a small number of hushkitted aircraft on
transatlantic routes, the majority of its carriers serving these
transatlantic routes are complying with the Regulation. Accordingly, the Regulation does not discriminate between EU and
U.S. air carriers in terms of access to Community airports or fair
opportunities to operate their international airlines.
189 Interview with Laurent Muschel, Transport Directorate-General, in Brussels, Belgium (Mar. 30, 1999).
190 See Chicago Convention, Art. 15, supra note 5.

191 See id.
192

See Chicago Convention, Art. 44, supra note 5.

19- See supra Part W.A.1.
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In addition, the Chicago Convention "does not prohibit discrimination, but merely considers the avoidance of discrimina'
tion as a goal to be achieved."194
The United States also claims that the EU Regulation violates
Article 33 of the Chicago Convention. Article 33 requires all EU
Member States to recognize the airworthiness certificates of U.S.
registered aircraft as valid, provided "that the requirements
under which such certificates and licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which
may be established from time to time pursuant to this
95
Convention.

1

However, the EU questions the validity of the U.S. certificates
of airworthiness. In particular, the EU contests the methodology United States authorities use to recertify hushkitted aircraft.
The noise tests the U.S. uses allegedly differ from those required
by ICAO, although the EU fails to present sufficient evidence in
this regard. In addition, the EU alleges that the United States
allows hushkitted aircraft pass the certification test under conditions which airlines cannot meet or do not respect under daily
normal circumstances. 196 The EU claims that the U.S. authorities use new operational restrictions, like takeoff weight restrictions and speed requirements, to ensure that the hushkitted
aircraft meet the Chapter 3 noise standard. The introduction of
such operational restrictions allegedly is contrary to the purpose
of noise certification, which is "to ensure that the latest available
97
technology is incorporated into the aircraft design.'

Article 37 of the Chicago Convention is also important, mandating that "[e]ach contracting State undertakes to collaborate
in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations ...

in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate

and improve air navigation."' 98 This provision is more of a
guideline or recommendation than an obligation imposed upon
contracting States. In addition, as explained above,1 99 the ReguB.D.K. Henaku, The ICAO CNS/ATM System: New King, New Law?, 19 AIR &
L. 146, 149 (1994). While the Regulation may have some adverse impacts
on the resale value of certain aging aircraft built and rebuilt by U.S. manufacturers, it may be argued that the provisions of the Chicago Convention apply to air
services, not to the resale value of aircraft.
195 See Chicago Convention, Art. 33, supra note 5.
196 See supra Part II.B.l.a.
197 See Foreword to Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, supra note
5.
198 Chicago Convention Art. 37, supra note 5.
199See supra Part IV.A.3.
194
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lation is not contrary to the Chapter 3 noise standard of ICAO
since it constitutes an operational rule, not covered by the ICAO
certification rules.
Moreover, even if the Regulation is contrary to the ICAO standards, the advisory nature of Article 37 allows for some exceptions. This is especially true when an international standard,
such as the Chapter 3 standard, has become an ineffective tool
in avoiding further noise pollution.
C.

COMPATIBILITY WITH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

All bilateral air service agreements between the United States
and the EU Member States contain an obligation to give U.S.
carriers a "fair and equal opportunity to compete in international air transportation." The U.S. government alleges that the
Regulation deprives their carriers of this fair and equal opportunity to compete. Since this issue has already been addressed sufficiently, reference is made to the relevant chapters.20 0
Most of these bilateral air service agreements also contain the
following important provision:
Neither party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, frequency or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types operated by the designated airlines of the other Party, except as may
be required for customs, technical, operational or environmental
reasons under uniform conditions consistent with Article 15 of
the Convention. 0
These agreements thus appear to allow a party to take unilateral action, provided that operational or environmental grounds
justify the action and uniform conditions apply. Even if the Regulation clearly has a sound environmental justification (the
avoidance of further noise pollution and the protection of
human health) it nonetheless still needs to be determined
whether such a measure is applied under uniform conditions
consistent with the non-discrimination principle of Article 15 of
the Chicago Convention. 2 2 Again, the EU Regulation does not
discriminate between EU and U.S. carriers but applies uniform
operating conditions to both.20 3
200

201

See supra Part V.B.
See Article 11 (3) of the U.S.-Luxembourg Air Transport Agreement, supra

note 106.
202 See Chicago Convention, Art. 15, supra note 5.
203 See supra Part IV.A.1 and Part V.B.
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Accordingly, the EU Regulation does not induce EU Member
States to violate their obligations towards the United States
under the above-mentioned bilateral air services agreements.
VI.
A.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

AMENDMENTS TO THE

EU

REGULATION

Although the EU Regulation fully complies with the principles set forth in the TBT Agreement, the Chicago Convention
and the bilateral air services agreements, the EU Regulation
could nonetheless be more consistent with some international
obligations, especially with the TBT Agreement and with the
Chicago Convention, if the following amendments were made.
First, the Regulation would be more consistent with Article 2.8
of the TBT Agreement if it introduced a stricter standard based
on performance characteristics rather than on design characteristics of aircraft engines. Even if the language of Article 2.8, i.e.
"wherever appropriate," does not impose a strong obligation on
WTO members to base their standards on performance characteristics, this standard is nonetheless clearly preferred since it is
more transparent than design or descriptive standards. Accordingly, the EU Regulation could require aircraft serving Community airports to follow stricter noise performance limits than
currently required by Chapter 3 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention. In particular, the Regulation could require aircraft serving EU airports to respect a certain noise level
expressed in X decibel, in accordance with the relative weight of
the aircraft concerned, that is lower than the noise levels allowed under Chapter 3. Therefore, U.S. carriers would be more
likely to meet the stricter performance standards and accordingly, the measure would have less impact upon these carriers.
Additionally, even if the various national registers are regarded as one Community register, the EU could allow for more
flexibility towards third country carriers by amending the Regulation's transfer rule. One option would be for the EU to allow
third country aircraft to be transferred from the register of one
third country to another/EU Member State register between
May 4, 2000, and April 1, 2002, without losing the right to operate in the EU after April 1, 2002, provided that this third country aircraft operated in the EU before May 4, 2000. A second
option would be that the transfer of aircraft between the registers of EU Member States after May 4, 2000 would also bar these
aircraft from serving Community airports after 2002. While the
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first option is preferred because it is less contrary to the idea of
the European Community as a single aviation market, 20 4 both
solutions would put third country aircraft on a more equal footing with European carriers and would affect the resale value of
older aircraft less significantly. Accordingly, third country aircraft would be given a fairer opportunity to compete in the
Community air transport market.
Nevertheless, both solutions can be equally doubted since
they seem to neutralize the environmental rationale of the Regulation. Indeed, the Regulation's aim is to prevent older aircraft with higher noise levels from coming into the Community.
If the transfer of older aircraft will not prevent it from serving
Community airports, a greater number of noisy airplanes will
come into the Community after 2002. Accordingly, there will
proportionately be more noise pollution in the vicinity of these
airports.
B. A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTION
At the outset of ICAO, the zoning of airports and residential
areas was viewed as the ideal solution in reducing noise at airports. Later, under the strong impetus of ICAO, the introduction and development of quieter aircraft was emphasized. In
this context, ICAO adopted Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention. This Annex sets out noise emissions standards, which have gradually developed into stricter standards.
Airport zoning, in conjunction with adopting noise emissions
restrictions, significantly reduced noise pollution around airports in developed countries. However, taking into account the
increased volume of air transport and the introduction of
longer aircraft, the EU viewed it as essential to push for further
noise reduction measures. In that context, and given the unexplained reluctance of the United States inside the ICAO forum
to agree on Chapter 4 standards, the EU thought it was neces-

sary to unilaterally adopt stricter standards, hoping to push the
other contracting parties to do the same.
But considering the past difficulties encountered by the contracting parties within CAEP when trying to agree on stricter
noise performance levels and notwithstanding the U.S. government's recent apparent willingness to expedite adopting such
stricter noise standards, it is advisable to develop still further the
possibilities offered by compatible land-use planning. The antic204

See Interview with Laurent Muschel, supra note 189.
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ipated future growth in the volume of air traffic will lead to a
further increase in noise levels around airports since noise levels
near airports are determined not only by the fleet mix serving
the airport, but also by the number of aircraft movements.
Compatible land-use planning and control is essential in ensuring that the current noise performance levels of aircraft are
not worsened or offset by further residential developments
around airports. Proper land use planning will prevent an increase in the number of people aircraft noise affects through
limiting inappropriate development. It also avoids unreasona205
ble constraints upon airport capacity and air transport.
In addition, as ICAO suggested at the Earth Summit in Rio,
there is a compelling need for adopting an international con206
vention on environmental protection related to civil aircraft.
Such an instrument would be preferable since it could specifically address environmental issues related to civil aviation separately and would induce Contracting States to consider this area
of environmental protection as an important matter in the
future.

205 There appears to be some truth to the argument that people are able to
purchase properties close to airports more cheaply in light of the noise factor.
But then, as soon as the number of purchasers reaches some critical mass, they
begin to organize to oppose the very noise factor that made their properties
cheaper to buy. Just as such groups gain political prominence in the U.S., so too
do they in Europe.
206 See Statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to
the Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/env/cop-4.htm>.

